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Collective Labor Disputes in
Post-Ceau§escu Romania
Introduction
On December 8, 1991, the Romanian people approved a new, post-com-
munist constitution.' The constitution included significant provisions
* Associate Professor, The University of Mississippi School of Law. The author
would like to express his appreciation to the Fulbright Foundation and to his
University for allowing him to spend a sabbatical year in Romania, where he was a
visiting professor at the University of Bucharest Faculty of Law during 1991-92. He
would also like to thank Dr. Alexandru Athanasiu, his colleague at the University of
Bucharest, for his insights into Romanian labor law, Dr. erban Beligrideanu, editor
of the Romanian law journal Dreptul, for generous gifts of his time and research, and
Anthony Kolankiewicz of the American Embassy, Bucharest, for opening doors to
Romania's labor leaders.
A word about sources and translations is necessary. Much of the written material
cited herein is available in computerized data bases. The British Broadcasting
Corporation's Summary of World Broadcasts is particularly helpful, as it makes
primary Romanian source material available in English translation.
A second major source of information cited herein is the Daily Press Summary, a
service of the United States Embassy in Bucharest that translates the major
Romanian newspapers and magazines and publishes an English-language summary
thereof. Although sold widely among the foreign embassies and businesses in
Bucharest, it is not generally available in the United States, insofar as the author
knows. Even though it is not itself a direct primary source of information, it is very
useful for tracking the basic features of Romanian public life. Citations herein
include both the Daily Press Summary reference and that of the Romanian
publication whose report it summarizes.
There is no standard English translation of Romanian statutes and other legal
materials. For Law 15/1991 and the other Romanian labor statutes cited, the English
translations of the United States Department of Commerce, NTIS Central & Eastern
Europe Legal Texts, are used, albeit with extensive modifications by the author which
seek to provide a translation that is both faithful to the original Romanian and
accessible to the reader.
In addition to the foregoing, citation is made herein to several Romanian
secondary legal sources and trade union documents not available in English.
Translations of these materials, as well as of the official Romanian gazette (Monitorul
Ofidal al Romdniei) were made by the author. Finally, a number of references are
made to the author's personal interviews of Romanian labor leaders and others, as
well as to speeches made by such persons which the author attended. Some, but not
all, of such references are based on contemporaneous notes made by the author.
1. According to Romania's Central Electoral Bureau, 76.5% of the voters
approved the new constitution, 21.3% voted against its adoption and 2.2% of the
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recognizing workers' collective rights. Article 9 therein, Trade Unions,
authorized the creation and existence of trade unions, as institutions
which "contribute to the protection of the rights and the promotion of
the professional, economic and social interests of employees." 2 Article
37, The Right to Associate, gave Romanians the right to "freely associ-
ate in... trade unions," while Article 38, Labor and the Social Protec-
tion of Labor, specified, inter alia, that "[tihe right to collective
bargaining and the binding nature of collective agreements are guaran-
teed."'4 Finally, Article 40, The Right to Strike, provided as follows:
(1) Employees have a right to strike to protect their professional, eco-
nomic and social interests.
(2) The law sets the conditions and limits for the exercise of this right as
well as the guarantees required for providing essential public services.
5
The first parliamentary body to function in Romania after the over-
throw of its communist dictatorship in fact had already passed legisla-
tion to regulate the right to strike ten months earlier, in February 1991.
Law 15/1991, Settlement of Collective Labor Disputes, 6 is one of a
package of three major statutes Romania's parliament passed in 1991.
Along with the other two statutes, Law 13/1991, Collective Labor Con-
tracts, 7 and Law 54/1991, Activity of Trade Unions,8 Law 15/1991
defines the scope within which the Romanian trade union movement
may now legally operate.
The focus of this article is Law 15/1991. This article attempts to
explain its provisions, especially its manifold restrictions on strikes, as a
reaction of the National Salvation Front (NSF), the ruling political fac-
tion in Romania following the fall of the communist regime of Nicolae
ballots were invalid. Gisbert H. Flanz, Romania, in 15 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUN-
TRIES OF THE WORLD 4 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1992). Parlia-
ment had approved the new constitution on November 21, 1991, by a vote of 414 in
favor and 95 opposed. Id. at 3.
2. The complete text of Article 9 is, "Trade unions are set up and carry out their
activity according to their statutes under the conditions of the law. They contribute
to the protection of the rights and the promotion of the professional, economic, and
social interests of employees." Id. at 6.
Placement of this article in Title I, along with others establishing the basic nature
of the Romanian state and citizenship, and especially its placement immediately after
Article 8, Pluralism and Political Parties, would suggest an intent to enshrine trade
unions as the constitutionally recognized equivalent of political parties, with the lat-
ter to function in the political sphere and the former to operate in the economic and
social, but not political, arenas. Id.
3. Id. at 12.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 13.
6. 1991 U.S. Dept. of Commerce, NTIS, Central & Eastern Europe Legal Texts,
February 11, 1991, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File.
7. 1991 U.S. Dept. of Commerce, NTIS, Central & Eastern Europe Legal Texts,
February 8, 1991, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File.
8. 1991 U.S. Dept. of Commerce, NTIS, Central & Eastern Europe Legal Texts,
August 7, 1991, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File.
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Ceau§escu, to the political and economic threat of the trade union
movement.
Almost two years before endorsing the new constitution, in Decem-
ber 1989, the Romanian people, at great and heroic risk to their lives,
overthrew Nicolae and Elena Ceau§escu, Eastern Europe's most odious
communist dictators.9 The self-styled NSF immediately seized the reins
of power. Although the NSF's initial appearance was that of a broad-
based coalition of opponents of the Ceau§escu regime, it quickly became
clear that former high-ranking communists, who had fallen from favor
with the dictator, and their associates dominated the NSF.' 0 Ion
Iliescu,11 Chairman of the NSF from its beginning, and Petre Roman, 12
whom Iliescu designated prime minister, led the NSF Council, a body
established as Romania's interim government. The Council moved rap-
idly to consolidate control successfully over Romania's state institutions.
As a result, the NSF and its initial governments charted the course of
political and economic reform on which Romania has now embarked.
In the midst of the December 1989 revolution, independent trade
unions also began forming. In short order Romania saw the birth of
full-fledged national trade union confederations. The trade unions were
soon pressuring the government to take actions contrary to what the
NSF leaders believed was in the best interests of Romania's economic
recovery. As early as January 1990, with spontaneous local efforts to
force changes in factory management, the unions quickly grew capable
of mounting strikes with nation-wide impact; by late 1990, the govern-
ment was buffeted with almost non-stop labor unrest challenging major
economic policies. The trade union movement had emerged as the
strongest opposition to the NSF. The movement attacked both micro
and macro economic issues, with targets ranging from forcing individual
management changes in state enterprises to pressuring the government
to forsake its price liberalization and privatization programs.
The NSF leaders realized by April 1990, that, as the people who
would continue to control the major Romanian economic enterprises in
the foreseeable future, it was in their best interests to curb the power of
the burgeoning labor movement. Thus, during the next ten months, the
government of Prime Minister Petre Roman and its allies in the
Romanian parliament crafted labor legislation designed to remove the
strike weapon as a significant factor of influence in national affairs. On
9. For a general account of the events of December 1989, see ANDREI
CODRESCU, THE HOLE IN THE FLAG (1991); NESTOR RATESH, ROMANIA: THE ENTAN-
GLED REVOLUTION (1991); Matei Calinescu & Vladimir Tism~neanu, Epilogue: The
1989 Revolution and the Collapse of Communism in Romania, in VLAD GEORGESCU, THE
ROMANIANS: A HISTORY (1991).
10. See Robert C. Toth, Leaders' Sons Work to Mold New Romania, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
31, 1989, at Al (brief sketches of members of the NSF).
11. Iliescu was a former official in the Ceau§escu regime who fell from favor with
the dictator in the early 1970's. Id.
12. Roman's father, Valter Roman, was an early leader of Romania's Communist
Party. Id.
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February 11, 1991, the product of their efforts, Law 15/1991, Settle-
ment of Collective Labor Disputes, came into effect.
In order to provide a context in which Western readers can place
Law 15/1991, Section I briefly explains the Romanian government's
economic policy during the period from late December 1989 until early
1991. Section II sketches the development of the Romanian trade union
movement during that period, and Section III chronicles the trade
unions' major disputes with the government which led to the passage of
Law 15/1991. Section IV describes and analyzes the statute itself, the
initial instances of its use against striking Romanian unions and the
response of the labor movement, which has been generally to resort to
other methods of furthering its goals. Finally, the article provides an
assessment for the future, namely, what was good for the NSF will prob-
ably be good for private enterprise.
I. The Economic Policies of the National Salvation Front from December
1989 to April 1991
It is useful to divide consideration of the NSF's economic policies into
two periods. The first period, December 1989 through June 1990,
immediately following the overthrow of Ceau§escu and preceding the
installation of the first elected government, primarily emphasized tem-
porary measures to bring basic material relief to the population after
years of deprivation under Ceau§escu. The second period began in June
1990, after the May elections for the Presidency and Parliament. At this
time, following a sweeping victory at the polls by the NSF, the govern-
ment began to develop and implement a long-range reform program.
A. Initial Efforts of the NSF Council and the Provisional Council of
National Unity-December 1989 -June 1990
On December 23, 1989, the day after Nicolae and Elena Ceau§escu fled
Bucharest, the official newspaper, Scinteia Poporului ("The Spark of the
People"), announced that the demonstrators who toppled Ceau§escu
had "declared firmly for socialism, for the people's ownership and hon-
est socialist principles untinged by the adventurist spirit and political
demagogy of the Ceau§escu clan." 13 The newspaper article referred
positively to Romanian Communist Party members, including activists
like Ion Iliescu who lost their positions because they failed to carry out
Ceau§escu's orders, and commented that the Romanian people would
follow the path of "purified socialism."' 14
If the December 23 article accurately mirrored the views of the new
leaders, the NSF's original objective was apparently a kind of socialist
perestroika akin to Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms at that time in the
Soviet Union. The NSF presented its program to the Romanian people
13. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, SCTNTEIA
POPORULUI, Dec. 23, 1989, at 1, 2 (Dec. 23, 1989) (on file with author).
14. Id.
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one day earlier, on December 22, 1989, its first day in power. The
Monitorul Oficial al RomtFniei (the Official Romanian Gazette, in which all offi-
cial government acts are published) contained the program, which was
unclear as to whether it envisioned a continuation of a reformed socialist
structure or something fundamentally different:
The NSF program proposed the following:
Restructuring the complete national economy based on criteria of profit-
ability and efficiency. Eliminating administrative-bureaucratic methods of
centralized economic leadership and promoting free initiative and com-
petence in leadership of all economic sectors. 15
In a January 4, 1990 speech on the state of the economy, given to
the NSF Council and chairmen of the NSF County Councils, Prime Min-
ister Petre Roman reported that, as a result of the policies of the old
regime, "the Romanian economy was in a state of profound crisis"; that
"the task of government [was] to try to get out of the crisis"; and, that
"the... priority.., was to start satisfying the immediate needs of the
people and immediately raise people's living conditions." 1 6 Prime Min-
ister Roman further informed his audience that there would be no
"shock therapy," no immediate move to convert the state-owned eco-
nomic structures through privatization and capitalization, and that he
envisioned a more gradual approach.' 7
15. Comunicatul Ctre Tara at Consiliului Frontului Salvdrii Nationale, MONrroRUL
OFICIAL AL RoMNIE1, Dec. 22, 1989, at 1.
16. Petre Roman's Government Economic Report to NSF Working Meeting, BBC Sum-
mary of World Broadcasts (Bucharest Home Service, Jan. 4, 1990) Jan. 9, 1990, avail-
able in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File.
Specifically, Roman proposed to address: the lack of modem technology; the
immediate need to import more energy; increasing consumer goods from domestic
sources and imports; stopping Ceau§escu's "lunatic investments" (Romania was fil-
led with ill-advised construction projects dictated not by economic logic or need, but
by Ceau§escu's megalomanic drive for enhanced industrial capacity); importing tele-
communications equipment; ensuring healthy monetary circulation; repairing and
restructuring enterprises that operated inefficiently; withdrawing the military from
"slave labor" (the army had been routinely used to supplement the work-force dur-
ing agricultural harvests and in the coal mines); and, respecting "the normal regime
and duration of work in all fields of activity." Id. at 2-6.
17. As Roman put it at that time:
For the time being, we cannot proceed on the path of brutal decentralization.
That would be to endanger the whole operation of our economy. We are,
however, concerned with moving towards decentralization and towards giv-
ing autonomy to enterprises, but, at this moment, we are thinking of this fact
and thoroughly studying this issue and as cautiously as possible."
Id. at 3.
The government was, however, prepared to permit new capitalist ventures. A
decree-law of the NSF Council published on February 6, 1990, allowed the creation
by Romanian citizens of small factories (maximum of 20 employees), professional
for-profit associations (maximum of 10 members), and family businesses. Decret-lege
privind organizarea ji desfdurarea unor activitdgi economice pe baza liberei initiative,
MONITORUL OFICIAL AL ROMXNIEI, Feb. 6, 1990, at 3-6. See also United States
Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ADEVXRUL, Feb. 6, 1990, at 5; ROMANIA
LIBERX, Feb. 6, 1990, at 3 (Feb. 6, 1990) (on file with author).
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Of the various dysfunctional aspects of Romania's economy at this
time, low productivity in particular troubled Petre Roman and NSF
Chairman Iliescu. There were many reasons for this problem, including
lack of energy and raw materials, and a breakdown in the centralized
system of directing production. The NSF leaders quickly identified
additional causes such as poor work habits and labor unrest in the work-
place. During a January 7, 1990 radio speech, in which he sought to
defend the creation of NSF enterprise councils,' 8 Chairman Iliescu
argued that in order to enhance production:
it is . . . vitally important to ensure normal working conditions in all
enterprises and in all economic, social and agricultural units, to ensure an
atmosphere of mobilisation of all forces in support of material
production.
We make a heated appeal to all workers, to all technical and eco-
nomic personnel in industry, transport and construction, trade and co-
operatives and to all farmers to show a high patriotic awareness and
human solidarity expressed concretely in work, in proper progress of pro-
duction processes and the fulfillment of all contractual commitments,
both on the internal market and in exports. Any activities liable to disturb
and hinder the normal progress of production will be reflected first of all
in a worsening of an already complex situation in the economy and will
ultimately affect the lives of all of us. Among other things, salaries for
January will only be ensured in relation to concrete results obtained at
work .... [A]ll political and civic activities must be carried out outside
working hours. Nothing must hinder productive activities....
It is above all in the interest of the working collectives to have capa-
ble and honest leaders. This can, however, be accomplished without hin-
dering the normal progress of production activities. Any demagogical
calls to lessen exactingness, work and technological discipline and the
observance of the working hours are harmful above all to the working
collectives and must be rejected .... 19
The government's concern with keeping workers on the job became
a major factor in the policies underlying the development of collective
labor dispute legislation. This sense of urgency grew in the following
months, as production continued to fall and organized labor unrest
increased.
In February 1990, the NSF reneged on its earlier pledges not to
seek power in the first elections, which were set for May 20, 1990. The
NSF registered itself as a political party on February 6 with Ion Iliescu as
its president and with a party platform which emphasized a gradual tran-
sition to a "liberalized, decentralized and diversified system based on
market mechanisms." '20
18. See infra note 45.
19. Speech by Ion Iliescu Calls on People to be United, BBG Summary of World Broad-
casts (Bucharest Home Service, Jan. 7, 1990) Jan. 9, 1990, available in LEXIS, Europe
Library, Alleur File.
20. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ADEVXaUL, Feb. 7,
1990, at 3; ROMANIA LIBERX, Feb. 7, 1990, at 5 (Feb. 7, 1990) (on file with author).
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Once the NSF was an avowed partisan entity, it reconstituted the
temporary governmental body in order to give it more legitimacy. The
NSF Council was abandoned in favor of a Provisional Council of
National Unity, which included representatives of other political parties.
Iliescu and Roman, however, remained in their former positions. The
Provisional Council established a governmental commission to study
means of moving toward a market economy.2 ' The commission's work
continued as the NSF and the opposition parties began to concentrate
on the coming elections. By the time of the elections in mid-May, the
commission prepared the first draft of a transitional strategy.2 2
B. The National Salvation Front's Reform Program Following Its
May 1990 Election Victory
The NSF won an overwhelming victory in the May 20, 1990 election.
Iliescu was elected President with 85% of the popular vote and the NSF
won 67% of the votes for parliament. 23 In his inaugural address on
June 20, Iliescu appointed Petre Roman as prime minister once again,
continuing the leadership team that had guided Romania since Decem-
ber 1989.24
Prime Minister Roman moved quickly to effectuate his plan for eco-
nomic reform. On June 28 he presented his program for parliamentary
approval. The program envisioned much more rapid changes in the
economy than NSF campaigners had led the country to expect.25
Roman's remedy for curing the damage the communist regime caused
centered on proposals that ultimately would move most of the old state
enterprises into the private sector, a "swift radical reform" intended to
demolish the old "hypercentralisation" and replace it with a market
economy.26
The NSF platform's diversification plans envisioned state, cooperative, par-
ticipatory, private and mixed ownership forms, with major plants continuing under
state ownership, but operating under market mechanisms. The plans also committed
the NSF to major social protection programs including minimum income policy,
health care, labor training, housing and protection of youth, elderly and the unem-
ployed, while declaring itself against "major differences in wealth between various
social categories." Id.
21. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMNIA LiBERX,
Feb. 27, 1990, at 3 (Feb. 27, 1990) (on file with author).
22. Iliescu and Roman Give Press Conference on Elections, Future Policy, BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts (Bucharest Home Service, May 23, 1990) May 26, 1990, available
in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File.
23. Final Election Results, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Rompres in Eng-
lish, May 25, 1990) May 28, 1990, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File.
24. Inaugural Address by President Iliescu, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts
(Bucharest Home Service, June 20, 1990) June 22, 1990, available in LEXIS, Europe
Library, Alleur File.
25. Petre Roman Presents Government Programme and New Ministers, BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts (Bucharest Home Service, June 28, 1990) June 30, 1990, available
in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File.
26. Id. at 18. The NSF's goal to purify socialism had disappeared from Roman's
agenda by this time. As he put it in this speech:
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Immediate restructuring of the nature of economic enterprises was
essential to Roman's program. The restructuring encompassed a rapid
move of state-owned businesses toward autonomy and thereby toward
individual economic accountability for their performance. The individ-
ual business entity, not the government as a whole, would become
responsible for generating profits and for handling the demands of its
workers for better wages and benefits. This transformation would occur
even though these organizations, for a time, would continue to be
owned by the state, as opposed to private interests.
Privatization of state enterprises was thus to follow the creation of
proper economic conditions. Instead, Roman placed priority on estab-
lishing the state's business entities on an independent economic footing,
with the government becoming a shareholder and taxer of profits, ceas-
ing to be the direct controller of the business. 27 The effort to transform
the state-owned commercial societies so that their survival would
depend on their economic merits was tempered by the recognition that
many of the communist industrial white elephants would not survive.
The elimination of these institutions constituted a daunting political
prospect, given the tens of thousands of angry, unemployed workers
these economic forces would generate. 28
The exclusive management of the economy by the state has proved to be a
failure in all societies and in all corners of the globe. The argument of the
socialist-collectivist economy, according to which the society's interests and
progress can be rigorously planned, thus leading to a so-called wonderful
internal balance, does not resist the scrutiny of a thorough scientific and eco-
nomic investigation. Such an analysis emphasises-unfortunately after a
much too long disastrous experience-that the main economic driving force,
consisting of economic agents and operators, is losing its identity. They are
included in calculations based on wishful and self-willed thinking, which
ignore reality and are totally subjective. Any theoretical discussion of the
degree of the state's intervention in the economy must clearly distinguish
between the promotion of collective interests through state policies and the
interference of the state in the economic mechanism.
Id. at 17.
27. Id. at 19-20. Parliament subsequently passed two statutes to accomplish this
restructuring, Law 15/1990, State Owned Enterprise Restructuring, promulgated
August 8, 1990, and Law 31/1990, Company Law, promulgated November 17, 1990.
Parliament did not enact the statutory framework necessary to privatize government-
owned businesses until late in 1991, with the passage of Law 58/1991, Privatization
of Commercial Companies, promulgated August 16, 1991. The Law Digest for Foreign
Investors contains a compilation of English translations of these statutes (Romanian
Development Agency, Bucharest, Feb. 1992).
28. Roman recognized from the beginning that the government would eventually
have to deal with this problem:
The situation is also very difficult because our economy, as we inherited it
from the madman, cannot sustain an immediate increase in living standards.
You see, hundreds and thousands of enterprises were created without think-
ing how, on what basis, with what resources, and with what skills they should
operate. However, thousands, scores of thousands of people are working
there. These people have to earn their living, a decent one.
Petre Roman Addresses Bucharest Rally, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Bucharest
Home Service, Jan. 29, 1990) Jan. 31, 1990, available in LEXIS, Europe Library,
Alleur File.
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The Prime Minister emphasized the need for a new way of thinking
and for a new generation of decisionmakers. He criticized enterprise
managements which had resisted reform since December 1989. Certain
managers, according to Roman, had tried to diffuse worker unrest by
reducing production while increasing salaries, which actually resulted in
increased costs with continuously decreasing production. 29 Given this
state of affairs, Roman viewed two conditions as essential to achieving a
successful transition to enterprise autonomy: "powerful management,
which is competent and able to assume responsibilities in administering
enterprises"; 30 and "a six-month moratorium on the trade unions' pay
and working conditions claims, in exchange for the government's pledge
to compensate for such reform elements that hurt incomes and working
conditions."' 3 1 As will be seen,3 2 the trade unions' unwillingness to
cooperate in securing these conditions helped set the stage for the gov-
ernment's restrictive strike statute.
In addition to enterprise autonomy, Roman's plan included liberali-
zation of prices and creation of the fiscal infrastructure necessary for
independent business activity to flourish: commercial banks, a stock
exchange, convertible currency, and some form of bankruptcy. 3 3 Of
these elements, the trade unions would immediately attack the liberali-
zation policy, which by eliminating government subsidies would increase
prices from their artificially low levels to ones reflecting more accurately
the true value of products and services.3 4
By the Fall of 1990, the government was pushing ahead with its
reform plan in an atmosphere clouded by labor unrest and a dramatic
drop in productivity. Industrial production had declined 28%o sinceJan-
uary 1990 while labor productivity had fallen by 23%o.3 5
The first phase of price liberalization took place on November 1,
1990, when the government ended subsidies on the prices of most items
Roman returned to this concern in his state of the union report delivered to Parlia-
ment on Feb. 26, 1991, after the first stage of the reforms had been completed,
Adjustment and eventually restructuring of the national economy, in con-
trast with the legal and institutional reform, is the most delicate part of the
transition process in our society, since it sums up unpopular aspects of this
process [-] the close-down or partial closure of production units, unemploy-
ment, price rises, a widespread sense of insecurity and discomfort.
Final Installments of Petre Roman's State of the Nation Report, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts (Rompres in English, Mar. 8, 1991) Mar. 27, 1991, at 25, available in
LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File.
29. Petre Roman Presents Government Programme and New Ministers, supra note 25, at
14.
30. Id. at 22.
31. Id. at 19.
32. See discussion infra Section III.
33. Petre Roman Presents Government Programme and New Ministers, supra note 25, at
20-24.
34. See infra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
35. Ariane Genillard, Romania Fighting to Right Economy, WAsH. TiMES, Oct. 23,
1990, at A7.
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except food, power, heating, fuel and rent.3 6 Plans to implement the
second round of price liberalization onJanuary 1, 1991, removing subsi-
dies on basic foods, medicines and children's goods, had to be post-
poned, however, following fears of widespread public unrest.3 7
The basic thrust of the government's reform program as of early
1991, when it passed Law 15/1991, involved immediate steps to put the
economy on a market-based footing, but leaving state enterprises in
government ownership for an indefinite period. Throughout 1990, the
trade unions played an increasingly active role in trying to influence
government decisions regarding everything from basic policy initiatives
to local enterprise management. It is therefore to the development of
the trade unions and to their activities during this period that our atten-
tion must now turn.
II. The Romanian Trade Union Movement-Origins and Early
Development 38
The only trade unions which existed before December 1989 were part of
the official structure of the communist system, the General Trade Union
Federation of Romania, or as it was known in Romania, the "UGSR"
(Uniunea Generals a Sindicatelor din Rominia). There were very few
reported efforts to form independent unions during the Ceau§escu era.
Authorities quickly suppressed a collaboration between intellectuals and
workers in 1979. 39 By early 1989, however, attempts to organize had
apparently begun again, 40 but there was never any true union move-
ment in communist Romania comparable to Poland's Solidarity, or to
36. Peter Humphrey, Parliament Extends Romanian Government Power Over Economy,
The Reuter Library Report, Nov. 12, 1990, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur
File. See also Prices Liberalisation Premier Roman Gives News Conference[sic], BBC Sum-
mary of World Broadcasts (Rompres in English, Nov. 1, 1990) Nov. 5, 1990, available
in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File. Prime Minister Roman insisted that govern-
ment subsidies to the population would insure that price liberalization would not
affect the country's living standards. Id.
37. Peter Humphrey, Romanian Government Retreats on Food Price Rises, Reuters,
Dec. 8, 1990, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File; see also Impact of Price
Reform in Romania, FINANCIAL TIMES, East European Markets, Jan. 11, 1991, available
in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File.
38. See generally Dan Ionescu, Romania: Trade Unions a Growing Force, Report on
Eastern Europe (Radio Free Europe, Mar. 29, 1991).
39. See Rumania: A Whiff of Trouble to Come, ECONOMIST, Oct. 24, 1981, at 37; see
also, Bradley Graham, The Voices That Refuse to be Silenced: Despite Official Harassment,
Voices of Protest Continue to be Heard, WASH. PosT, June 18, 1985, at Al.
According to a noted Romanian historian, this effort resulted in the formation of
the Free Union of the Working People of Romania, with locals in several regions of
the country and over 2,000 members. The collaboration lasted no more than two
weeks, however, and its leaders were all imprisoned. GEORGESCU, supra note 9, at
264.
40. See Hungarian TV Interview with Romanian Historian, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts (MTI in English, May 8, 1989) May 12, 1989, available in LEXIS, Europe
Library, Alleur File. A Washington Post story in early January 1990 reported the
existence of a shadowy labor union underground which had existed since the mid-
1970's and which, long before the December 1989 uprising, had planned nationwide
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the Bulgarian trade union confederation, Podkrepa.4 1
The absence of a true union movement did not mean, however, that
there was no worker opposition to the regime. In 1977, and again in
1987, huge anti-government protests were mounted in state industries.
The 35,000 coal miners of the Jiu Valley struck in 1977, angry about a
new pension law which reduced their benefits, as well as poor food sup-
plies and overtime requirements. 42 The government initially capitu-
lated to their demands, but quickly reneged on its agreements; the strike
leaders subsequently disappeared. 43
Ten years later, in November 1987, the workers at the Red Flag
tractor and truck factory in Bra§ov, Romania's second largest city and a
major industrial center, rose in a spontaneous protest against pay cuts.
More than 20,000 people stormed through the city streets, seized City
Hall and the Communist Party headquarters and burned some of their
contents before riot police and militia regained control. 44
Although there were no independent trade unions when the people
took to the streets in December 1989, unions began to appear almost
immediately in the aftermath of Ceau§escu's fall. Unfortunately, those
which were most quickly created, with the blessings of the NSF,4 5 were
groups established and dominated by activists from the old UGSR. On
demonstrations of some sort for March 1990. Jonathan Randal, Romanian Says Patri-
otic Song Signaled Revolt, WASH. POST, Jan., 9, 1990, at Al.
41. See Bulgaria Communists Call Unions' Plan "Blackmail", L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 25,
1989, at AI3.
42. See Colin Mcintyre, Strikes, REUTERS, Aug. 17, 1980, available in LEXIS, Europe
Library, Alleur File.
43. Id. See also Rumania: A Whiff of Trouble to Come, supra note 39. Miron Cosma,
the current leader of the Jiu Valley Miners who claims to have been a participant in
the strike, confirmed to the author the reported events in 1977, including the "disap-
pearance" of the strike leaders. Interview with Miron Cosma, President of the
League ofJiu Valley Miners, (Feb. 10, 1992). Since 1989, theJiu Valley miners have
continued their tradition of violent confrontations, both on behalf of and against the
government. See infra notes 80-81; text accompanying notes 226-28.
44. See Colin McIntyre, Romanian Unrest Seen as Biggest Challenge to Regime Since
1977, Reuter Library Report, Nov. 25, 1987, available in LEXIS, Europe Library,
Alleur File; Workers Riot Over Shortages, Facts on File World News Digest, Nov. 27,
1987, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File; LorenJenkins, Ceausescu Survives
Another Winter of Discontent: Romanian Leader Affirms Rigid Grip on Country Despite Protests,
Lack of Heat, Food, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 1987, at A34.
One of Romania's contemporary labor organizations, the "15 November" Trade
Union Confederation, named in memory of this uprising, is led by Mircea Sevaciuc,
who was a leader of the workers in the 1987 protests; he was banished and impris-
oned for his role and later emerged as a leader of anti-government forces in Bra§ov
in December 1989. Report of the ICFTU Coordinating Committee on Central and
Eastern Europe, Appendix I, at 6 (June 11, 1991) (on file with author).
45. At first, the NSF attempted to put its own representatives directly into the
workplace. In addition to creating NSF councils at the national, county and local
levels, these representatives also established NSF "enterprise councils." Chairman
Iliescu saw the council as a non-adversarial link between the enterprise's managers
and the central government:
[T]he Front's councils in the enterprises ... must not interfere with the
current activities of the technical-administrative management of the
enterprises.
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December 27, just five days after the communist government collapsed,
the Romanian Press Agency (soon to be known as Rompres) announced
the creation of "the Provisional Committee which will replace the Gen-
The latter bears full material and financial responsibility for the activities of
the enterprises, and it must be helped to fulfil its obligations. There can be
situations in which the working collectives are dissatisfied with the quality,
competence and moral authority of certain leaders. In these circumstances,
the councils of the NSF as representatives [sic] bodies can appeal to the
higher authorities so that together they can ensure their replacement by suit-
able people .... The NSF Councils within the enterprises, as organs which
represent the working people, can and must take an active interest in ensur-
ing good work and production progress and in this way exercise public con-
trol . . . over the way the leading cadres and the technical-administrative
machinery are fulfilling their duty.
However, this must not be done with arbitrary methods or by issuing
orders nor through substitution, but in a constructive fashion, thus facilitat-
ing the solution of problems through consensus and active co-operation.
Speech by Ion Iliescu Calls on People to be United, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts
(Bucharest Home Service, Jan. 7, 1990) Jan. 9, 1990, available in LEXIS, Europe
Library, Alleur File. See also NSF and Government Affairs; Guide issued on Status of NSF
Councils, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Rompres in English, Jan. 12, 1990)Jan.
16, 1990, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File (asserting, inter alia, that the
enterprise councils were not to have "political ambitions of management and control
over the technical-administrative management" and that free trade unions would
eventually take over the functions of the enterprise councils).
Opposition parties immediately attacked the enterprise councils as NSF's effort to
retain control over the enterprises. Cf. Interview with NSF Leaders, BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts (Bucharest Home Service, Jan. 13, 1990) Jan. 17, 1990, available in
LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File (Iliescu defends against attacks by the National
Democratic Party by arguing that the enterprise councils were actually a creation of
low-level activists and that both the councils and the NSF would eventually
disappear).
More importantly, the workers themselves rejected the councils in favor of estab-
lishing actual trade unions. Teodor Stetcu, Vice-President of Fr~lia in 1991-92, told
the author that he began his trade union career shortly after the December 1989
overthrow of the government; his fellow workers chose him to lead the independent
union they created at the Policolor factory; virtually his first official act was to expel
the NSF enterprise council from the factory. In this fashion, the workers across
Romania spontaneously rejected this NSF initiative. See, e.g., Celestine Bohlen,
Upheaval in the East," Democracy Dazes Some Romanians, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1990, at A9
(workers at the 23 August factory, later renamed Faur, a 20,000 employee enterprise
in Bucharest, reorganized the NSF council into a trade union); Mary Battiata, Political
Parties Perplex Romanians; Salvation Front Benefits from Worker Fear of 'Foreign Masters',
WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1990, at A32 (the 14,000 employees of the Enterprise of Ready-
made Clothes and Knitting, the largest clothing plant in Eastern Europe, formed
their own trade union and forced out the most unpopular communist managers);
United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMANIA LiBERX, Feb. 6,
1990, at 1; Feb. 9, at 2 (Feb. 6 and Feb. 9, 1990) (on file with author) (various reports
from mines and factories across Romania of dissolutions of NSF enterprise councils
coupled with creation of tree trade unions in their places).
Recognizing the failure of the enterprise councils, the NSF ordered them to dis-
continue their activities in early February 1990, at the same time the NSF acknowl-
edged its intention to convert itself into a political party and compete in the May
1990 elections. NSF Holds Final Meeting Before Re-formation, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts (Bucharest Home Service, Feb. 3, 1990) Feb. 6, 1990, available in LEXIS,
Europe Library, Alleur File.
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eral Trade Union Confederation in Romania [UGSR]. ' 46 The leaders
of this Provisional Committee, which evolved within a few months into
the Confederalia Nalionala a Sindicatelor Libere din Rominia, Confed-
eration of Free Trade Unions of Romania (CNSLR), treated the vast
assets of the UGSR as something entirely within their control. They
offered the NSF Council the use of the UGSR's vacation facilities for
victims of the Ceau§escu regime, as well as fifty million lei from the
UGSR's coffers to be used to help the families of victims of the recent
fighting.47 The leaders expressed their support for the NSF's program,
called for free elections to restructure the trade unions and announced
that a national conference of "the Union of Free Trade Union Federa-
tions in Romania" would be held before the parliamentary elections in
the Spring of 1990, "so that it may nominate its own candidates to those
elections." 48
Less than a month later, on January 25, 1990, the first national
trade union organization untainted by connections with the communist
past appeared. The Independent Trade Union Confederation "Fr$jia"
(Brotherhood) was created by representatives of the Drivers' Union and
the unions at three factories: IMGB Heavy Equipment Factory and
Policolor, both in Bucharest, and the "First of May" factory, in
Ploie§ti.49
Frlia's founders were motivated from the beginning by a desire to
resist what they saw as the continuation of the UGSR in the form of the
Provisional Committee and the national structure it was establishing, the
future CNSLR.5 0 Throughout much of 1990, one of Frgia's major
46. Programme for Free Trade Union, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Romanian
Press Agency in English, Dec. 27, 1989) Dec. 29, 1989, available in LEXIS, Europe
Library, Alleur File.
47. Id. The Provisional Committee later denied that it had offered money to the
Front, publishing a letter from the Romanian National Bank purporting to prove that
no cash had been paid from the Committee's accounts (presumably the UGSR funds)
to any "political formations." Trade Union Denials of Funds for NSF, BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts (Bucharest Home Service, Feb. 24, 1990) Mar. 1, 1990, available in
LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File.
48. Programme for Free Trade Union, supra note 46; see also United States Embassy
(Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ADEVXRUL, Dec. 29, 1989, at 3; ROMANIA LIBERX,
Dec. 29, 1989, at 3; TINERETUL LIBER, Dec. 29, 1989, at 2 (Dec. 29, 1989) (on file with
author). For an amusing, yet disturbing, view of one factory's effort to implement the
elections for new unions called for by the Provisional Committee (and the Front), see
Jonathan Randal, A Romanian Lesson in Democracy: With Humor and Anger, Factory Work-
ers Elect Representatives, WASH. PosT, Jan. 13, 1990, at A17 (proceedings dominated by
local communist party propaganda chief).
49. Frd ia-Together Will Be Stronger, Fr5ia News, No. 1/92 (undated) (informative
bulletin published in English by Frlia; on file with the author).
50. Miron Mitrea, Report Presented to the First Congress by the Co-ordinator [sic] of the
Independent Trade-Unions [sic] Confederation "Frdgia", (undated; the Congress was held
Sept. 23-28, 1991) (on file with the author).
Members of Frlia were very visible in their attacks on the CNSLR within the first
weeks of Fr5Jia's creation. Its accusations that CNSLR was simply a new version of
the old communist trade unions appeared in the Bucharest press in late February,
1990. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, LiBERTATEA, Feb.
27, 1990, at 3 (Feb. 28, 1990) (on file with author). Fr5ia representatives sent as
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objectives, along with most of the other independent trade unions not
affiliated with CNSLR was to end the control CNSLR exercised over the
money and facilities it inherited from the UGSR. 51
As of late 1991, it was estimated that Frlia had more than 850,000
members in 19 professional federations and 30 territorial branches. 52
In September 1991, the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions accepted Friia as its first Romanian member.53
InJune 1990, CNSLR held a national congress at which it adopted
its constitution and elected new leadership. Its president, Victor
Ciorbea, maintains that the congress marked the end of the CNSLR as a
body dominated by former activists in the communist UGSR.54 In 1992
CNSLR claimed a total of 2.5 million members in 19 occupational feder-
ations and 41 territorial unions. 55
OnJune 7, 1990, Romania saw the birth of the Alfa Cartel, the third
of the large labor confederations which appeared in 1990. Seven union
federations, representing workers in metal fabrication, steel, electronics,
observers to the provisional branch government in Bucharest protested the participa-
tion of CNSLR members in that body. Id. at 2. A leader of the First of May factory
complained that the old trade unionists were hampering the activities of the Fr~lia
affiliate there and that the government had blocked access to the funds of the former
trade unions. Id. at 3.
51. See, e.g., United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMANIA
LIBERX, June 8, 1990, at 1 (une 8, 1990) (on file with author) (Fr5lia, together with
the Inter-Union Alliance, issues a communique requesting, inter alia, support in
recovering the assets of the UGSR).
52. Report Presented to the First Congress by the Co-ordinator of the Independent Trade
Unions Confederation "Frdia" [sic] (undated pamphlet, prepared for the September 23-
28, 1991, Fr5iia Congress; on file with the author).
53. Interview with Mr. Miron Mitrea, President of the ITUC "Fr lia," Fr lia
News, No. 1/92, supra note 50.
54. Interview with Victor Ciorbea, President of the National Free Trade Union
Confederation of Romania (CNSLR), in Bucharest, Romania, (Apr. 16, 1992). Arti-
cle 29 of CNSLR's constitution specifies,
Unemployed people and people who abused their authority in political,
juridical and administrative offices, who violated the basic human rights, as
well as people who organized or were instruments of repression in the secur-
ity bodies, the old police and militia, cannot be elected to the leading bodies
of the Confederation.
Moreover, the former activists in the Romanian Communist Party, (P.C.R.),
Union of Communist Youth (U.T.C.) and the General Union of the
Romanian Trade-Unions (U.G.S.R.), as well as the people with top positions
in the administrative bodies of the old regime, are not eligible for the leading
bodies of the Confederation.
Art. 29, THE STATUTE OF THE NATIONAL FREE TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION OF
ROMANIA (CNSLR), adopted June 29, 1990 (on file with the author).
Mr. Ciorbea maintained that after the June 1990 Congress, CNSLR dismissed or
pensioned off the former communist activists who had been active in CNSLR's early
days. Accordingly, even ordinary employees such as secretaries were replaced if they
fell in this category. This practice continued in the federations and territorial unions
which made up CNSLR's membership. Interview with Victor Ciorbea, supra.
55. Introducing the CNSLR, (undated pamphlet produced by the CNSLR, on file
with author).
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coal mining, petrochemicals, paper and the military,5 6 joined together
to create Alfa.57 By the following spring Alfa claimed 1.3 million mem-
bers, although it seemed to be experiencing frequent additions and
departures among its affiliated organizations. 58
In addition to CNSLR, Fr5&ia, and the Alfa Cartel, the Romanian
labor movement has seen a dizzying array of confederations, federa-
tions, and local unions arise, join in alliances and disaffiliate. 59 As one
experienced observer succinctly put it in mid-1991, "Romanian trade
unions split more often than amoebas, most often due to the whim of
leadership." 60 There is no logical division of unions based upon profes-
sion, trade or industry among the various confederations and federa-
tions. Workers in the same industries, and sometimes in the same
factories, may be represented by several different unions, each of which
is affiliated with a different federation. In theory, a federation is com-
posed of local trade unions in the same industry. A confederation is
formed from two or more federations. While there is no agreement on
the accuracy of anyone else's membership claims, it was generally
accepted by early 1992 that CNSLR, Frilia and Alfa Cartel together
accounted for approximately 85% of the trade union membership in
Romania. 61
HI. Labor Disputes in Romania Preceding the Passage of Law 15/1991:
December 1989 - February 1991
A. Events Prior to Swearing in the First Elected Government (June
1990)
In the six months between the overthrow of Ceau§escu in December
1989 and the inauguration of the first elected government in June 1990,
56. Report of the ICFTU Coordinating Committee on Central and Eastern Europe, Appen-
dix I (Report on the Different Trade Union Groupings in Romania as of 15 May
1991) June 1991, at 3 (on file with the author).
57. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMANIA LIBERX,
June 8, 1990, at 3 (June 8, 1990) (on file with author).
58. Report of the ICFTU Coordinating Committee on Central and Eastern Europe, supra
note 56, at 2-3 (Appendix I).
59. Some of the more active organizations in 1991 included Hercules (a confed-
eration of transport worker federations), CONSENERG (a federation of electric
energy workers), Aliania Intersindicala (a Bra§ov-based organization, which declined
in importance after the September 1990 city-wide strike in Bra§ov), see infra text
accompanying notes 88-92, and "15 November," also a Bra§ov centered organiza-
tion, which takes its name from the November 1987 uprising, discussed supra note 44
and accompanying text.
60. Report of the ICFTU Coordinating Committee on Central and Eastern Europe, supra
note 56, at 4 (Appendix I).
61. During interviews the author conducted in the winter of 1992, this figure was
not disputed by leaders of COSIN (the Confederalia Sindicatilor Independente
Neafiliali), a relatively small labor organization, or by representatives of BNS (Blocul
Nalional Sindical-The National Union Bloc), the fourth largest confederation to
emerge in Romania, created inJune 1991 by the merger of trade union federations in
power production (CONSENERG), printing, post and telecommunications, machine
building and electronics.
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labor strife reflected the ad hoc nature of events in Romania. The
strikes, protests and rallies were almost entirely local in nature and were
typically concerned with improving conditions specific to the site of the
activity. 62 A high percentage of worker demands in this time period
dealt with removal of the old, communist-era managers. 63 The govern-
ment's response frequently was to send high-level representatives,
including President Iliescu and Prime Minister Roman, to negotiate
with, and frequently to capitulate to, the workers.64
62. One of the earliest reported strikes was that of public transportation workers.
They walked off the job on January 10, 1990, claiming they were being beaten by
passengers dissatisfied with the operation of the trams. The workers insisted that it
was not their fault that the depots were poorly equipped and the transportation sys-
tem outdated. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ADEVXRUL,
Jan. 11, 1990 (Jan. 11, 1990) (on file with author).
63. For example, in early January 1990, workers in plants in Briila protested
against former Ceau§escu officials appointing themselves to the local NSF council.
United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMNIA LIBER,, Jan. 6,
1990, at 2 (Jan. 8, 1990) (on file with author). These protests were apparently fol-
lowed by local action. Within a month it was reported that a free trade union had
been created at the heavy equipment plant in Brjila and that the local NSF council
had been dissolved. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary,
ROMINIA LIBER,, Feb. 2, 1990, at 5 (Feb. 2, 1990) (on file with author).
Further examples of worker efforts to remove managers during this period include
the following: a strike by employees of the Pipera wood processing factory in
Bucharest on January 18, 1990 led the local NSF council to fire undesirable officials
and investigate their past activities, United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press
Summary, ROMANIA LIBERX,Jan. 19, 1990, at 5 (Jan. 19, 1990) (on file with author); a
four hour warning strike in March 1990 by the union representing employees at the
Ministry of Petroleum sought the dismissal of a ministerial counselor (who was the
former head of the NSF council organizational commission) for "lack of appropriate
competence and experience," United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Sum-
mary, ROMZNIA LIBERX, Mar. 8, 1990, at 1 (Mar. 8, 1990) (on file with author); the
teachers' union affiliated with Fr5&ia struck on April 2, requesting, inter alia, changes
in inspectorate personnel, United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary,
ROMNIA LIBERX, Apr. 3, 1990, at 2 (Apr. 3, 1990) (on file with author); on May 7,
200 pharmacists demonstrated in Bucharest against the promotion o" former com-
munist party activists to positions as Ministry of Health inspectors, as well as the
granting of scholarships to France for former directors dismissed for incompetence
and abuse, United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, TINERETUL
LIBER, May 8, 1990, at 2 (May 8, 1990) (on file with author).
64. In the first two months alone the following meetings were widely reported:
on January 16, 1990, Prime Minister Roman received a delegation of miners from
Maramure§ seeking shorter underground working hours, better pay and pensions,
and better living and health care conditions (Roman found their complaints justified
and consulted with the Minister of Mines on ways to grant them relief), United States
Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ADEVXRUL,Jan. 17, 1990, at 3; RoMZNIA
LIBERX, Jan. 17, 1990, at 5 (Jan. 17, 1990) (on file with author). NSF Chairman
Iliescu and Roman met with the Jiu Valley coal miners on January 20, 1990, to dis-
cuss the latter's grievances, United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Sum-
mary, ADEVXRUL, Jan. 20, 1990, at 4 (Jan. 22, 1990) (on file with author). Roman met
with railway workers on January 28, 1990, to discuss their professional problems,
Reports on Government and Parties; Petre Roman Meets Railway Workers, BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts (Rompres in English, Jan. 29, 1990) Jan. 31, 1990, available in
LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File. Iliescu met with miners from across Romania
on January 30, 1990, United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary,
ROMANIA LIBERX, Jan. 31, 1990, at 5 (Jan. 31, 1990) (on file with author). Iliescu met
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There were several particularly serious labor disputes which
resulted in strikes during this initial phase of the NSF government. In
February 1990, the coal miners from Cavnic, in Maramure§, went on
strike to force the Prime Minister to receive their representatives, who
sought the resignation of the Minister of Mines and expressed dissatis-
faction with the results of an earlier meeting with Roman.6 5 After the
miners in Baia Mare walked out on February 12, in solidarity with their
Maramure§ counterparts, Roman traveled to Cavnic, met with the min-
ers for three hours and granted all of their requests, including the
assignment of a representative of the Prosecutor General's office to
investigate charges against the Minister of Mines.6 6
The same day that Prime Minister Roman reached an agreement
with the Maramure§ miners, the crews of Romanian commercial vessels
in the harbors of Constanla, Galaji, Br~ila, Tulcea and Sulina struck,
protesting the Minister of Transportation's refusal to grant their
requests for better pay and working conditions.6 7 This was followed by
another coal miners' strike, in the Jiu Valley, by a walk-out by the air
traffic controllers at Bucharest's Otopeni International Airport, and by a
strike of the Metro drivers in the Bucharest subway, paralyzing the capi-
tal's most efficient transportation system. 68 Finally, a Romanian
seamen's strike in the port of Galaji on May 23, 1990, over demands for
pay increases and night shift bonuses, 69 threatened supplies of materials
to the gigantic steel mill in Galaji and caused the government to author-
ize the use of military tugboats to deliver the materials.7 0 The seamen
returned to work on May 31, after talks with government officials
the workers of the First of May plant in Ploie§ti on February 27, 1990, to discuss their
requests for a five-day work week, the dissolution of the old trade union, and a list of
Securitate informers in the plant. Iliescu was noncommittal, which angered the work-
ers. Scuffles ensued and the union, a Fr- ia affiliate, held a warning strike. United
States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMANIA LiBERX, Mar. 2, 1990
(Mar. 2, 1990) (on file with author).
This response understandably led the workers and the unions to believe that they
could routinely expect such high-level government intervention to address their
problems in the workplace. While Roman, Iliescu and other government officials
continued this practice during the crises, it became clear that by the summer of 1990
Roman, at least, no longer willingly did business in this direct fashion. See infra note
92 and accompanying text.
65. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMANIA LIBERX,
Feb. 9, 1990, at 5 (Feb. 9, 1990) (on file with author). See supra note 64 for a refer-
ence to the January 16 meeting with Roman.
66. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMANIA LIBERX,
Feb. 13, 1990, at 3 (Feb. 13, 1990) (on file with author).
67. Id. at 1.
68. Adrian Dascalu, Strikes Pose Challenge for Romania's Interim Rulers, The Reuter
Library Report, Apr. 21, 1990, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File.
69. Callfor Commission of Inquiry to Look into Sailors' Strike, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts (Rompres in English, May 29, 1990) June 1, 1990, available in LEXIS,
Europe Library, Alleur File.
70. Government Acts to Overcome Impact of Sailors' Strike, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts (Rompres in English, May 30, 1990) June 1, 1990, available in LEXIS,
Europe Library, Alleur File.
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resulted in the granting of most of their demands. 7 1
Labor agitation of an entirely different order appeared during this
pre-election period as well; trade unions began joining mass protest
movements with other groups opposed to the NSF. On March 11, 1990,
writers, journalists, intellectuals and students sponsored rallies in
Bucharest, Timi§oara and Ia§i. The demonstrators disseminated a docu-
ment called the "Timi§oara Proclamation," which, among other things,
called for free enterprise and the banning of all former communist party
officials, which would have included Iliescu and many other NSF leaders,
from running for political office in the upcoming elections. 72
While labor leaders were participants in the Timi§oara 73 and Ia§i
demonstrations, 74 the organizers of a Bucharest-based union demon-
stration, held that same day in support of claims for a five-day work
week, enterprise autonomy, distribution of UGSR assets and release of
Securitate records, refused to join the Bucharest "Timi§oara" rally. 75
Labor reluctance to join political protests quickly disappeared, however.
As support for the principles and proponents of the Timi§oara Procla-
mation grew in the coming weeks, major elements of the union move-
ment also embraced it. On April 1, 1990, the Fr~ia confederation
sponsored rallies in several cities, including Bucharest, in support of the
proclamation and its call to rid the government of former communist
party and communist trade union activists. 76
Responding to media criticism of its actions, Frglia issued a state-
ment disavowing support for any specific political organization but
declaring both its endorsement of the Timi§oara Proclamation and its
71. Sailors End Strike, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Rompres in English,
May 31, 1990) June 6, 1990, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File.
Other strikes in the period ending in late June included: a 24-hour strike at the
Bucharest Electricity Distribution Plant, United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily
Press Summary, ROM.NIA LIBERX, Apr. 24, 1990 (Apr. 24, 1990) (on file with author);
cf. Andrej Gustincic, Romanian Demonstrators in Tense Confrontation with Police, The Reu-
ter Library Report, Apr. 23, 1990, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File; a
union strike at the Oil Ministry on May 7, United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily
Press Summary, TINERETUL LIBER, May 8, 1990, at 2 (May 8, 1990) (on file with
author); Bucharest pharmacists' warning strike on May 13 and 14, United States
Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMNIA LIBERX, May 14, 1990, at 1
(May 14, 1990) (on file with author); public transportation workers' strike in Ia§i, a
city in Moldavia, In Brief; Poor Economic Performance and Strikes, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, May 10, 1990, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File.
72. See generally Mass Rally Devoted to Timisoara Proclamation, BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts (Bucharest Home Service, Mar. 11, 1990) Mar. 13, 1990, available
in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File; Peaceful Demonstrations Held in Bucharest, BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts (Rompres in English, Mar. 11, 1990) Mar. 13, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File; United States Embassy (Bucharest),
Daily Press Summary, ADEVXRUL, Mar. 13, 1990, at 1; ROMANIA LIBERX, Mar. 13,
1990, at 1, 3 (Mar. 13, 1990) (on file with author).
73. Mass Rally Devoted to Timisoara Proclamation, supra note 72.
74. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, supra note 72.
75. Peaceful Demonstrations Held in Bucharest, supra note 72.
76. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMANIA LIBERX,
Apr. 3, 1990, at 1, 2 (Apr. 3, 1990) (on file with author).
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intention to pressure the political parties in furtherance of its economic
and social goals. 77 In an interview, Fr5jia's leader, Miron Mitrea, dis-
missed the political parties as too weak to run the country, stressed the
need for strong trade unions and called for the elimination of commu-
nist activists from government and the enterprises. Furthermore, he
complained about the continuing control of UGSR assets by the Provi-
sional Committee (CNSLR) and expressed his support for privatization,
although he said it should be achieved gradually.78
Highly visible segments of the independent trade union movement
thus became identified as aligned with the burgeoning anti-NSF move-
ment which swept the major Romanian cities in the weeks immediately
before and after the May 20, 1990 national elections. On May 8, anti-
NSF demonstrators held a news conference to voice their many political
demands to the government. The demonstrators consisted largely of
university students who established and occupied a tent city in Univer-
sity Square in Bucharest for seven weeks. In mid-June, the government
and its allies, the Jiu Valley miners, finally drove them from University
Square. The demonstrators' demands included the creation of trade
union laws in accordance with international conventions, the dissolution
of the old UGSR structure (i.e., the Provisional Committee, soon to
become CNSLR, and its local organizations) and the distribution of the
UGSR assets to the new trade unions. 79
Between June 13 and 15, 1990, President-elect Iliescu, referring
chiefly to the students and others who were in the tent city at University
Square, declared the government under attack from fascist troublemak-
ers intent on its violent overthrow and called upon the workers of
Romania to come to Bucharest to defend it. As a result, thousands of
coal miners from the League of Jiu Valley Miners, along with workers
from some Bucharest factories, roamed the streets of the capital for two
days, attacking students, intellectuals, opposition party leaders, newspa-
per offices and any suspicious-looking person.80 These events illustrate
not only the level of political instability present in Romania at that time,
but also the central role organized labor played in the political struggle;
on the one hand the rogue Jiu Valley miners81 and on the other hand
77. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMNIA LIBERX,
Apr. 4, 1990, at 1, 2 (Apr. 4, 1990) (on file with author).
78. Id.
79. University Square Demonstrators Hold News Conference, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts (Bucharest Home Service, May 8, 1990) May 10, 1990, available in LEXIS,
Europe Library, Alleur File.
80. The miners' rampage brought world-wide attention and condemnation to
Romania. For a representative sampling of the coverage of these incidents in the
United States media, see, e.g., Celestine Bohlen, A Backlash in Romania: In Calling Out
Miners to Stifle Opposition, President Forfeits Control and Good Will, N.Y. TIMES, June 18,
1990, at Al; R.C. Longworth, Trampling of New Democracy Confuses, Dispirits Romanians,
Cal. TRIB., June 17, 1990, at C5.
81. This was the third time the miners had descended on Bucharest prepared to
attack opponents of the NSF. The other times were on January 29 and again on
February 19, in response to opposition groups' political demonstrations. See United
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the trade union leaders who worked strenuously to persuade the work-
ers in their factories not to answer Iliescu's pleas for violence.8 2
B. Trade Unions Resist the Newly Elected Government's Economic
Reform Initiatives: The Strike Becomes an Overt Political
Weapon
The new government was presented to parliament on June 28, 1990.
On that date, the reappointed Prime Minister, Petre Roman, called for a
six-month moratorium on pay and working condition claims by
Romania's trade unions.8 3 Organized labor was understandably cool to
the proposal, but the major confederations appeared to give their
grudging consent, conditioned upon the government meeting various
demands or conditions.8 4
States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMANIA LIBERX, Feb. 2, 1990, at
5 (Feb. 2, 1990) (on file with author) (reporting allegations that, in January, the NSF
arranged special trains to bring the miners from Petro§an, in the Jiu Valley, to
Bucharest); United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ADEVXRUL,
Feb. 20, 1990, at 1; ROMANIA LIBERX, Feb. 20, 1990, at 1, 3 (Feb. 20, 1990) (on file
with author) (reporting that over 5,000 miners came to protest an "attack" on gov-
ernment headquarters the previous day). Iliescu had reportedly won the miners' loy-
alty after he granted them pay increases in January which gave them the highest
salaries in Romania except for the most senior government officials. Ariane Genil-
lard, Romanian Leader Blames Right Wing for Violence, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 18,
1990, at 6.
By the June 1990 episode, Romanians had begun calling these incidents "miner-
iada," a play on words which evoked Ceau§escu's name for his communist sporting
events-"daciada" (Romanians trace their heritage to the Dacian people, who inhab-
ited the territory of present-day Romania during the time of the Roman Empire).
The last "mineriada" (at the time of writing) took place during the author's stay in
Bucharest. TheJiu Valley miners returned to Bucharest to demand that the govern-
ment fulfill its promises of handsome economic benefits. As a result of this visit, and
the violent street demonstrations it set off, the government of Prime Minister Petre
Roman fell. See infra text accompanying notes 226-28.
82. In a speech on June 14, 1990, in the midst of the "mineriada," in which
Iliescu praised the miners and other workers who had answered his call to arms, he
took the occasion to make the following observation: "The trade union leaders, who
are concerned only with their own well-being and who stop the workers from display-
ing their combat spirit, should be replaced." Iliescu Addresses Victoy Square Meeting on
Unrest, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Bucharest Home Service, June 14, 1990)
June 16, 1990, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File.
83. Petre Roman Presents Government Programme and New Ministers, supra note 25, at
19.
84. Fr5.iia's initial response was supportive. Calling Roman's program "close to
our soul," its leaders said the confederation was prepared to help prevent further
social tension, characterizing strikes as "an extreme alternative to which one should
resort only when all the other possibilities of settling [conflicts] were exhausted,
because they do nothing else but deepen the economic crisis and worsen the employ-
ees' material condition." Independent Trade Union Supports Government, BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts (Rompres in English, July 11, 1990) July 16, 1990, available in
LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File. What Fr-gtia sought in return was a delay in
promulgation of the law on collective labor disputes during the moratorium period,
greater union input into the law regulating trade unions and denial of CNSLR's
access to UGSR's assets. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary,
ROMANIA LIBERX, July 1, 1990, at 1 (July 2, 1990) (on file with author). CNSLR simi-
larly agreed to the moratorium, as long as the government published certain wage
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In mid-August, Prime Minister Roman met with a "joint working
commission" established by Friia, the Alfa Cartel, CNSLR and several
smaller union organizations. 8 5 The participants hailed the meeting as
the "starting point of organised and systematic talks between the gov-
ernment and trade union representatives," to be followed by the crea-
tion ofjoint government-union commissions "to focus on the questions
that concern the trade union movement."'86
While such a commission did materialize three months later,8 7
trade union frustrations had already escalated into major unrest, mostly
outside the ranks of the three large labor confederations. The trade
unions in Bra§ov were the first to explode. Unhappy with the inade-
quate supply of raw materials and supplies in the large local machine-
building enterprises, as well as the poor living conditions and absence of
consumer goods, workers at the huge Tractorul factory struck on
August 23, 1990, demanding that Prime Minister Roman come to Bra-
data, froze consumer prices, ensured employment and retraining for persons losing
their jobs due to economic reorganization and met its demands regarding various
labor statutes under consideration in parliament, demands which also included a
moratorium on the collective labor dispute legislation. United States Embassy
(Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, DIMINEATA,July 14, 1990, at 6 (July 16, 1990) (on
file with author).
The Alfa Cartel's public response came a few days later, on the heels of the govern-
ment's decision to raise the price of gasoline. It demanded, among other things, a
moratorium on the increase in the price of goods and services during the moratorium
on salaries. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMNIA
LmERX, July 20, 1990, at 2 (July 20, 1990) (on file with author).
Following a series of meetings between high-level government officials and the
trade unions, Fr5lia further conditioned its acceptance of the moratorium on the
"eliminat[ion of] nationwide income disparities" and a freeze on consumer prices,
combined with ensuring the availability of consumer goods. United States Embassy
(Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMNIA LIBERL, Aug. 7, 1990, at 3 (Aug. 7,
1990) (on file with author). CNSLR agreed to accept it until December 31, 1990, as
long as the government worked out a program of consumer goods supply and
refrained from exporting items that were in short supply on the domestic market.
United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, DiMINEATA, Aug. 4, 1990,
at 7 (Aug. 6, 1990) (on file with author). One of the smaller trade union organiza-
tions, the Inter-Union Alliance, proposed that a new agreement replace the morato-
rium and attached a long list of requirements to its willingness to participate. United
States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMNIA LIBERX, Aug. 9, 1990, at
2 (Aug. 9, 1990) (on file with author).
Government leaders, in the meantime, were apparently telling the union repre-
sentatives that the government would resign if the moratorium was not accepted.
United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, DREPTATEA, Aug. 9, 1990,
at 2 (Aug. 9, 1990) (on file with author).
85. Roman Meets Trade Union Leaders, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Rom-
pres in English, Aug. 17, 1990) Aug. 21, 1990, available in LEXIS, Europe Library,
Alleur File.
86. Petre Roman Discusses Economy with Trade Unionists, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts (Rompres in English, Aug. 20, 1990) Aug. 23, 1990, available in LEXIS,
Europe Library, Alleur File.
87. On November 15, 1990, Roman again met with the union leaders to establish
a joint commission. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary,
ROMNIA LIBERX, Nov. 17, 1990, at 7 (Nov. 19, 1990) (on file with author).
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§ov to negotiate their demands.88 The government denounced the
strike, characterizing it as "unlawful" because it was taking place during
the six-month moratorium.8 9 Although the strikers returned to work a
few days later,90 the prospect of a renewed general strike still loomed. 9 1
This threat forced Roman to go to Bra§ov, where he met with the trade
union leaders on September 7, assuring them that his economic reforms
would lead to improvements in their conditions. 92
88. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMANIA LIBERX,
Aug. 24, 1990, at 2 (Aug. 24, 1990) (on file with author). Several days earlier, Roman
had responded to the Infratirea trade union federation's ultimatum threatening a
warning strike by sending a government commission to Bra§ov to meet with enter-
prise leaders, local politicians and trade union representatives. United States
Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMANIA LIBERX, Aug. 21, 1990, at 3
(Aug. 21, 1990) (on file with author); Prime Minister Orders Investigation of Brasov Strikes,
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Rompres in English, Aug. 21, 1990) Aug. 23,
1990, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File. The unions were unimpressed.
Following the commission's meeting at a rally held at the Tractorul stadium,
thousands of workers booed the government representatives and demanded
Roman's presence in Bra§ov. Brasov Trade Union Meeting Calls for Direct Talks with the
Premier, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Rompres in English, Aug. 22, 1990)
Aug. 24, 1990, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File; Government and Brasov
Trade Unions Discuss Supply Problems, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Rompres in
English, Aug. 23, 1990) Aug. 25, 1990, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur
File.
89. Government Statement on Brasov Strike, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts
(Rompres in English, Aug. 27, 1990) Aug. 30, 1990, available in LEXIS, Europe
Library, Alleur File. The government also asked the workers to reconsider and
return to work, pointing out that the strike was costing the national economy over 20
million lei each day and creating great difficulties in other economic units. Id. The
value of the leu, Romania's currency, relative to hard currencies such as the dollar,
has changed dramatically since 1989. During the author's stay in Romania, the value
of one dollar rose from about 240 lei to almost 400 lei.
90. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMANIA LIBERX,
Aug. 30, 1990, at 2 (Aug. 30, 1990) (on file with author). The government had prom-
ised them a number of structural changes in their enterprise intended to enhance its
autonomy. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMANIA
LIBERX, Aug. 29, 1990, at 3 (Aug 29, 1990) (on file with author).
91. The Infratirea federation was threatening a general strike if the Tractorul
employees' demands were not met. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press
Summary, ROMANIA LIBERX, Sept. 1, 1990, at 2 (Sept. 1, 1990) (on file with author).
The Inter-Union Alliance expressed its solidarity with Infratirea. Id. at 3.
92. Romanian Prime Minister Opens Talks with Free Trade Unions, The Reuter Library
Report, Sept. 7, 1990, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File. Roman
rejected their salary demands as unrealistic, but promised to analyze them in light of
concessions granted to workers in other industries. United States Embassy
(Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMANIA LIBERX, Sept. 9, 1990, at 1, 2 (Sept. 10,
1990) (on file with author).
The government issued a communique after Roman's visit in which it agreed to
coordinate the availability of resources. The government clarified, however, that in
the future, each enterprise would be responsible for such matters in accordance with
market economy principles. Government Communique on Talks with Trade Unions, BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts (Rompres in English, Sept. 14, 1990) Sept. 17, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File. Apparently, the Prime Minister was
determined not to tolerate continuing pressure by enterprises to have the govern-
ment solve their operating problems. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily
Press Summary, NEUER WEG, Sept. 13, 1990, at 1, 2 (Sept. 13, 1990) (on file with
author).
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No sooner had the government weathered the Bra§ov events than
the largest work stoppage since the 1977 miners' strike erupted. On
September 17, 1990, over 25,000 workers at Constanja harbor walked
off the job, demanding the removal of allegedly anti-reform managers. 93
The walkout coincided with strikes by sailors on twenty-five Romanian
ships in foreign harbors.9 4 The workers sought changes in the funda-
mental nature of the business operation, not just improvements in their
wages and working conditions. 95 Events took a decidedly political turn
as the strikers asked Ion Rajiu, an opposition member of the Assembly
of Deputies (and an unsuccessful candidate for president in the May
elections) to take over control of the Romanian fleet, a request he
declined.96 Again, however, high-level negotiations, this time with the
Minister for Public Enterprise and Transportation, resulted in satisfying
the bulk of the strikers' demands and the strike ended on September
24.97
The month of October 1990 was relatively quiet. Not counting a
number of minor work stoppages, the largest labor dispute occurred on
October 29, when the STAR Federation of Road Transport Unions
started a general strike which reportedly involved almost two-thirds of
the nation's drivers.9 8 The main complaints focused on the lack of spare
parts, but other issues involving pay increases, holidays, and pensions
led to an agreement between the government and federation officials to
create legislation to address these problems. 9 9
The government's decision to "liberalize" the prices of most goods
and services, effective November 1, 1990,100 sparked nationwide pro-
tests. The Alfa Cartel led the opposition from the ranks of the trade
unions.10 1 In general, the unions were opposed to the "shock therapy"
in which prices would rise steeply on many goods, but salaries would not
93. Catherine Adams, Strike Cripples Romanian Black Sea Port, UPI International
1990, Sept. 17, 1990, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File.
94. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMANIA LIBERX,
Sept. 20, 1990, at 1 (Sept. 20, 1990) (on file with author).
95. Ion Ratiu Declines Strikers' Offer to Command Fleet, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts (Rompres in English, Sept. 20, 1990) Sept. 22, 1990, available in LEXIS,
Europe Library, Alleur File.
96. Id.
97. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ADEVXRUL, Sept.
25, 1990, at 1, 3 (Sept. 25, 1990) (on file with author).
98. Road Transport Strike, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Rompres in Eng-
lish, Oct. 30, 1990) Nov. 3. 1990, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File.
99. Id. At the same time, however, the government authorized the Ministry of
Defense to take over transportation of food and raw materials in the event of future
transportation strikes. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary,
ADEVXRUL, Oct. 31, 1990, at 1 (Oct. 31, 1990) (on file with author).
100. See supra text accompanying notes 33-37.
101. With membership drawn from many of the inefficient state industries at risk
in an extended program of privatization, Alfa embraced a reform plan devised by
economist Constantin Cojocaru. The plan centered on an immediate 100%o priva-
tization of property by transferring shares directly to all qualifying Romanian citi-
zens. See Roxana Dascalu, Trade Unions Challenge Romanian Austerity Policies, The
Reuter Library Report, Nov. 3, 1990, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File.
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increase. In addition, they also favored a greater emphasis on immedi-
ate privatization, rather than liberalization of prices in an economy still
largely state-owned. Massive street demonstrations occurred in
Bucharest, Bra§ov, Timi§oara and other cities during the first two weeks
in November. While there were no significant strikes during this time,
there was talk of a general strike in the future.10 2
In the midst of the price liberalization uproar the government and
the trade unions held several acrimonious sessions. On November 5,
during a dialogue with the unions, Prime Minister Roman threatened to
resign if controversy over government policy continued.' 0 3 The repre-
sentatives of the labor organizations present, including Frtia and
CNSLR, but not Alfa, emphasized that they backed the reforms in prin-
ciple, but favored reversing priorities by placing privatization ahead of
price liberalization, much as Alfa had been urging.' 0 4
The joint government-union commission Roman established as a
vehicle for continuing dialogue with the trade unions over national pol-
icy held its first meeting on November 15.105 This effort to divert dem-
onstrations into discussion and negotiation failed. The next day, FrSlia
condemned the commission as a sham "to keep up democratic appear-
ances" and implemented under pressure from the European parlia-
102. See generally Peter Humphrey, Romanians Protest Against Government Economic Pol-
icy, The Reuter Library Report, Nov. 2, 1990 (rally of 2,000 people in Bucharest
sponsored by Alfa), available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File; United States
Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMANIA LIBERX, Nov. 3, 1990, at 5
(Nov. 5, 1990) (on file with author); Other Reports on Price Liberalisation; Trade Union
Protest at Price Liberalisation, BBC Summary Of World Broadcasts (Rompres in English,
Nov. 3, 1990) Nov. 5, 1990, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File (CNSLR
protests the price liberalization); Peter Humphrey, Demonstrators Roam Romanian Capi-
tal in Price Protests, The Reuter Library Report, Nov. 3, 1990, available in LEXIS,
Europe Library, Alleur File (third day of protests in Bucharest); Marc Champion,
Romanians Protest over Prices; "Shock Treatment" Enrages Workers, WASH. POST, Nov. 6,
1990, at A15 (the continuing protests and background information); Ariane Genii-
lard, Romanians Protest Price Decontrol, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 8, 1990, at 8(same); Peter Humphrey, Romanian Price Protests Spread to Timisoara, The Reuter
Library Report, Nov. 8, 1990, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File; Cathe-
rine Adams, Tens of Thousands Protest Liberal Pricing throughout Romania, UPI INT'L, Nov.
15, 1990 (protests in Bra§ov), available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File;
Thousands Demonstrate Against Romanian Government in Timisoara, The Reuter Library
Report, Nov. 8, 1990, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File.
103. Government and Trade Unions Discuss Price Liberalisation, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts (Rompres in English, Nov. 5, 1990) Nov. 7, 1990, available in LEXIS,
Europe Library, Alleur File.
104. Id. During this time, the government and its supporters in the Romanian
press launched a counter-offensive against the "Cojocaru Plan," supported by the
Alfa Cartel. See supra note 101. Terming it "ushering Stalinism into [the] economy
by the back stairs," they stressed the need to phase in privatization more gradually.
"Dimineata" Criticises Alternative Privatisation Scheme, BBC Summary of World Broad-
casts (Rompres in English, Nov. 6, 1990) Nov. 9, 1990, available in LEXIS, Europe
Library, Alleur File.
105. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMANIA LIBERX,
Nov. 17, 1990, at 7 (Nov. 19, 1990) (on file with author).
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ment.10 6 The Alfa Cartel refused to even participate.1 0 7
By early December, the Drivers' Union affiliated with Fr5tia was
frustrated by what it saw as the government's unresponsiveness to the
trade unions' demands and the economic crisis resulting from the price
liberalizations. The Drivers' Union announced that its leadership had
decided to call a nationwide strike for December 10. Its stated objective
was the resignation of the government and its replacement with a new
government of national coalition.1 08 The strike commenced, notwith-
standing the government's decision to postpone the next round of price
liberalizations originally scheduled for January 1, 1991.109
The Drivers had the support not only of FrAia, their own confeder-
ation, but of six other national trade union organizations as well, includ-
ing the Alfa Cartel and the usually non-militant CNSLR. 1 10 The
106. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, VIrroRuL
ROMANESC, undated, No. 14, at 3 (Nov. 23, 1990) (on file with author).
107. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMANIA LIBERX,
Dec. 5, 1990, at I (Dec. 5, 1990) (on file with author).
108. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMNIIA LIBERX,
Dec. 7, 1990, at 5 (Dec. 7, 1990) (on file with author). The Drivers' communique also
demanded that local government and enterprises be "purged" of "discredited" peo-
ple. Id. The union promised to permit the transportation of food, as well as of sup-
plies to hospitals, kindergartens and nursing homes. Id. See also Drivers' Union Press
Conference on Purpose of Strike, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Rompres in Eng-
lish, Dec. 8, 1990) Dec. 11, 1990, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File;
United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, DREPTATEA, Dec. 8, 1990,
at 4 (Dec. 10, 1990) (on file with author) (a Fr~lia communique regarding the rally it
planned for Bucharest on December 10, to coincide with the strike).
109. Initially, the government's plan had called for prices on basic foods, medicine
and medical supplies to increase on January 1. This deadline was postponed until
June 1. Government Postpones Price Liberalisation, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts
(Rompres in English, Dec. 7, 8, 1990) Dec. 12, 1990, available in LEXIS, Europe
Library, Alleur File.
While this decision was doubtlessly influenced by many factors, the government
was clearly concerned with the threat posed by the Drivers' Union strike. At the same
meeting in which price increases were postponed, the government discussed the
strike threat. Later, the government spokesman reported that the Cabinet's view of
the demands for its resignation and "other purely political claims" was that they were
"antisocial, antinational and unlawful." Id. The government spokesman also dis-
cussed a more localized labor action, in which the Union at the Media§ Gas Central
was threatening to strike unless it was allowed to become autonomous. In response
the spokesman said, "We must clearly state that the organization of economic units
falls outside the competence of unions, hence to threaten a strike for such claims
which are essentially administrative is also unlawful." Id.
110. Drivers' Union Press Conference on Purpose of Strike, supra note 108. CNSLR had
demanded that the government hold high-level negotiations with it during this time,
failing which it threatened to use "available forms of union protest." United States
Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, REALITATEA, Dec. 8, 1990, at 1 (Dec. 10,
1990) (on file with author); see also Trade Union Confederation Sends Ultimatum to Govern-
ment, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Rompres in English, Dec. 8, 1990) Dec.
11, 1990 (same CNSLR communique), available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur
File. Prime Minister Roman and other cabinet ministers did meet with CNSLR on
December 10, at which time it was agreed that the government would work more
closely with them on pending labor legislation, enterprise reform and social protec-
tion measures. Government and Trade Unions Hold Dialogue, BBC Summary of World
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organizations participated in a huge rally held in Bucharest on Decem-
ber 10.111 Earlier that morning, the union leaders met with President
Iliescu, who agreed to act as a mediator in talks scheduled with the gov-
ernment for the following day.' 1 2
The government-trade union talks occurred on December 11 and
12 in Bucharest where a Drivers' blockade denied access to everything
except essential medical and security services.1 13 Government conces-
sions in those meetings, including an agreement to negotiate the terms
of pending labor legislation covering strikes," 14 satisfied the Drivers and
FrSjia and they agreed to call off the strike, thus averting a threatened
general strike by a coalition of labor organizations. 15
Broadcasts (Rompres in English, Dec. 10, 1990) Dec. 12, 1990, available in LEXIS,
Europe Library, Alleur File.
111. Drivers' Strike Begins with Rallies in Bucharest and Elsewhere, BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts (Rompres in English, Dec. 10, 1990) Dec. 12, 1990, available in
LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File; see also United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily
Press Summary, ROMANIA LIBERX, Dec. 11, 1990, at 2 (Dec. 11, 1990) (on file with
author).
112. Trade Union Leader President Iliescu to Mediate in Round-table Talks [sic], BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts (Bucharest Home Service, Dec. 10, 1990) Dec. 12,
1990, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File.
Following the meeting, Fr~lia's leader, Miron Mitrea, issued a statement to the
press in which he expressed his organization's frustration in dealing with the govern-
ment and its expectations for future influence:
Unfortunately, we can say that most trade unions and the Fratia confedera-
tion had left the joint commission organised at governmental level, for rea-
sons which are easy to understand. We no longer accepted a consultative
role. We want a commission where we can talk to the government, because in
Romania there is no employers' organisation with which the trade unions can
negotiate. Right now, in order to defend the rights of trade union members,
we must negotiate with the sole de facto employer, [that is, the government].
In various consultative commissions, we... conducted consultations, but did
not negotiate. We must negotiate all laws regarding the trade unions and
strikes. The parliament is currently debating other draft laws. Consequently,
that period was but a waste of time.
Id.
113. Adrian Dascalu, Romanian President Mediates to Avert General Strike, The Reuter
Library Report, Dec. 11, 1990, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File.
114. The agreement provided that Iliescu would resubmit the legislation on unem-
ployment protection to parliament for reconsideration of amendments agreed to by
the government and the trade unions; the government would analyze union propos-
als regarding amendments desired in pending legislation regarding collective labor
disputes (the future Law 15/1991), collective bargaining (the future Law 13/1991),
trade unions (the future Law 54/1991) and salaries, with agreed amendments to be
submitted to Parliament; the joint government-trade union commission would begin
to consider the problems caused by the restructure and reform program, starting
with the problems of the Drivers; the government would take steps to insure
improved food supplies. Trade Unions and Government Hold Meeting, BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts (Rompres in English, Dec. 11, 1990) Dec. 15, 1990, available in
LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File. The salaries of the Drivers were to be negotiated
with the individual enterprises and enterprises would become autonomous. United
States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMANIA LIBERX, Dec. 13, 1990,
at 5 (Dec. 13, 1990) (on file with author).
115. Roxana Dascalu, Truckers to Halt Action, Premier Says General Strike Unlikely, The
Reuter Library Report, Dec. 12, 1990, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File.
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Frlia's willingness to forego broader political objectives when it
achieved its more limited economic and labor-related goals probably
saved Prime Minister Roman's government. The day after reaching the
Drivers' agreement, however, on December 14, 1990, trade unions in
Timi§oara began city-wide strikes, demanding broad economic restruc-
turing for local enterprises, as well as the government's dismissal.
Occurring on the emotional first anniversary of the December 1989
uprising, the entire community, together with opposition political orga-
nizations from across Romania, rallied to their side." 1 6 Work stoppages
continued in Timi§oara until the middle of January, 1991.117 By the
time the union leaders agreed that workers at most of the local enter-
prises should return to work, the government capitulated to many of the
strikers' demands."18 The government did not fall, however, nor did
the labor leaders' call for country-wide action produce results. 19
The atmosphere surrounding this labor dispute had by this time become highly
charged politically, as opposition political groups had seized on the dispute as a way
to topple the government. Many of the groups were greatly disappointed when the
Drivers settled for satisfaction of their economic claims and ceased their strike. Id.
116. Chris Stephen, Strikes and Protests Return to Timisoara, Reuter Textline (Guard-
ian), Dec. 15, 1990, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File. As was the case
with the demonstrations earlier in 1990 in support of the "Timi§oara Proclamation,"
the protests in December 1990 began as a coalition of workers, students and opposi-
tion political groups, including the newly emerged Civic Alliance. Id.
117. For additional details on the events, see Vjekoslav Radovic, Tens of Thousands
of Workers and Students Protest in Timisoara, Reuters, Dec. 19, 1990, available in LEXIS,
Europe Library, Alleur File; Romanians March Against Government, S.F. CHRON., Dec.
20, 1990, at A20; Anti-Government Strike Paralyzes Romanian City, Reuters, Jan. 9, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File.
118. Following January 11-12, 1991, meetings between the Minister of Resources
and Industry and the union leaders, the government agreed to do the following in
Timi§ Judet (County): liberalize salaries; turn all Timi§ enterprises into commercial
or autonomous state enterprises; increase the enterprises' share of hard currency
profits for foreign investments; and insure additional supplies of raw materials.
United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMNIA LIBERX, Jan. 15,
1991, at 7 (Jan. 15, 1991) (on file with author). The unions rejected this compromise
as incomplete, demanding that the reforms apply across Romania, not just in Timi§,
and renewing their calls for the dismissal of the government and for other parts of
the country to join their general strike. Id.
119. By January 16, the general strike ended in Timi§oara, although a few labor
leaders continued the protest as a hunger strike for a while longer. See generally
United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROM;,NIA LiBERX, Jan. 16,
1991, at 1, 2 (Jan. 16, 1991) (on file with author); United States Embassy (Bucharest),
Daily Press Summary, ROMANIA LIBERX,Jan. 17, 1991, at 1, 2 (Jan. 17, 1991) (on file
with author); United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMNIA
LIBERX, Jan. 18, 1991, at 1, 2 (Jan. 18, 1991) (on file with author); United States
Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROM.,NIA LIBEP_,, Jan. 22, 1991, at 2
(Jan. 22, 1991) (on file with author).
During this time there was an important, but unrelated, labor dispute by the navi-
gators at TAROM, the national airlines. Seeking higher salaries, they struck from
December 14, 1990, until January 16, 1991. United States Embassy (Bucharest),
Daily Press Summary, ROM;,NIA LIBERX, Dec. 15, 1990, at 1 (Dec. 17, 1990); Tarom
Navigators' Strike; All Flights Suspended from 19th December, BBC Summary of World
Broadcast, Dec. 19, 1990, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File; United
States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMANIA LIBERX,Jan. 16, 1991, at
1 (Jan. 16, 1991) (on file with author). They disrupted air traffic into and within
399
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The final significant labor unrest which preceded passage of Law
15/1991, the collective labor dispute statute, involved a strike which
crippled important parts of the nation's rail system. The Free Union
Convention of Railways and Subway, which had threatened a strike on
February 8, 1991,120 agreed to postpone the action for fifteen days, after
the government granted 14 of its 20 demands.' 2 ' Three of its local
unions: the Ia§i, Timi§oara and Caransebe§ Departments, decided to
proceed, however, and paralyzed several portions of the nation.122 In
the midst of this hotly contested dispute, Law 15/1991 came into effect
and the government immediately invoked it as a basis for legal action
against the strikers.' 23 The following section will address the mixed
results of this effort, as well as the extent of subsequent strike actions
and the application of Law 15/1991.124
IV. Law 15/1991-Settlement of Collective Labor Disputes 125
A. Legislative History of 15/1991
Communist Romania had no laws regulating collective labor disputes
and strikes, as such events were not supposed to occur in a workers'
state.126 The law did not expressly forbid them; rather, there was a
"legislative void."' 27 After 1989, therefore, there was no legislative pre-
Romania, with heavy concomitant economic loss to tourism and other industries
dependent on air transportation. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press
Summary, ADEVXRUL, Dec. 21, 1990, at 5 (Dec. 21, 1990) (TAROM management
characterize losses as "extremely high"); United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily
Press Summary, ADEVXRUL, Jan. 9, 1991, at I (Jan. 9, 1991) (on file with author)
(losses to a single commercial company put at five million dollars; flow of tourists
"seriously" decreased).
120. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROM.NIA LIBERX,
Feb. 1, 1991, at 1 (Feb. 1, 1991) (on file with author). Their claims involved salaries,
pensions, medical care, dismissal of "compromised members of the staff' and com-
pensation for the prohibition of the right to strike. Id.
121. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMANIA LIBERX,
Feb. 9, 1991, at 1 (Feb. 11, 1991) (on file with author).
122. Id.
123. See infra text accompanying note 214.
124. See discussion infra section IV.D.
125. Extensive commentary on this statute, in Romanian, is contained in the
following sources: *ERBAN BELIGRXDEANU, LEGISLATIA MUNCII 1990-1991, Vol. I, at
149-77 (Editura Lumina Bucure§ti 1991); GHEORGHE BREHOI & A. PopEscu,
CONFLICTUL COLECTIV DE MUNCX §i GREVX (Editura Forum Bucure§ti 1991), at 42-
115; erban Beligr~deanu, Legea Nr. 15/1991 Pentru Solutionarea Conflictelor de Muncd,
DREPrUL, Number 2-3/1990, at 3-14; §erban Beligr'deanu, Dreptul la Grevd 4i
Exercitarea lui, DREPTUL, Number 6/1990, at 16-27.
126. A Romanian dictionary published in 1980 defined a strike ("grev") as an
"organized form of struggle of the working classes in conditions of capitalism."
VASILE BREBAN, DICTIONAR AL LIMB!! ROMANE CONTEMPORANE (Editura ,tinjifici §i
Enciclopedicg Bucure§ti 1980).
127. BREHOI & POPESCU, supra note 125, at 40. After the government passed the
Labor Code of 1950, with no references to collective labor disputes, "the problem of
strikes and of collective labor disputes no longer constituted an object of study for
Romanian legal doctrine." Id. at 40-41. Under the influence of Soviet doctrine, "the
right to strike, without being expressly forbidden, was purely and simply ignored." Id. at 41
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cedent to impede the NSF.' 28
The government first proposed regulations for collective labor dis-
putes as early as April 1990. The Provisional Council of National Unity
circulated a draft decree-law at that time, but withdrew it in the face of
trade union protests.' 29 Following the installation of the new govern-
ment in June, the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection resumed work
on draft legislation. The major trade union federations, however,
demanded a moratorium on its implementation during the govern-
ment's proposed six-month salary increase and strike moratorium as
part of the price of their support for the government's proposal.13 0 The
trade unions resisted the government's draft legislation as being too
restrictive,13 1 and CNSLR attempted to ameliorate the restrictions in
extensive amendments it proposed in late July.'
3 2
By October 1990, with massive trade union resistance to the gov-
ernment's policies, Prime Minister Roman pleaded with the parliament
to pass the collective labor dispute law using emergency procedures.'
3 3
His rationale for this legislation and a companion bill on trade union
organization was revealing:
(emphasis in original), citing 6 H. SINAY &J.C. JAVILLIER, DROIT DU TRAVAIL, La Greve
(2d ed. Dalloz Paris 1984).
128. Romania previously had legislation regulating collective labor disputes,
passed shortly after World War I and amended several times during and shortly after
World War II, but this legislation was eliminated by the communist regime. Id. at 37-
40.
129. Interview with Victor Ciorbea, President of CNSLR, in Bucharest, Romania,
(Apr. 21, 1992). See also United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary,
ROMXNIA MUNcrrOARE, Apr. 23, 1990, at 2 (Apr. 24 1990) (on file with author) (Free
Trade Union Federation in Chemistry and Petrochemistry demands CPUN not
approve decree on strikes prior to consultation with trade unions); Draft Law on Set-
tling Strikes Published, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Rompres in English, Apr.
26, 1990) Apr. 30, 1990, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File (draft decree
law submitted to public debate by Provisional Council of National Unity, followed by
submission to the Council for approval in future sessions). Many of the features of
Law 15/1991 were present in this initial proposal, including: emphasis on the right
to work; mandatory conciliation; majority worker support as a prerequisite to a strike;
and prohibition of the right to strike in many government operations and in essential
sectors of the economy. Id.
130. See, e.g., United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary,
DIMINEATX, July 14, 1990, at 6 (July 15, 1990) (on file with author) (CNSLR demands
moratorium on the law regarding labor conflicts).
131. Miron Mitrea, president of Fr5&ia, observed that under the government's
draft, "[oinly people who work at night will be able to strike during the day." Ariane
Genillard, Romania Moves Toward Private Enterprise-and Labor Strife, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MoNITOR, July 31, 1990, at 5.
132. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMANIA
MUNCrTOAR-, July 26, 1990, at 2 (July 26, 1990) (on file with author). A copy of the
CNSLR proposal is on file with the author.
133. Economic Report by Premier Petre Roman, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts
(Rompres in English, Oct. 18, 1990) Oct. 20, 1990, available in LEXIS, Europe
Library, Alleur File (prime minister's economic report to a joint session of
parliament).
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We think that enactment of the trade unions bill and of the bill on
labour conflicts ... will stimulate work. A precise definition of the com-
petence of unions and their sharp separation from the management pro-
cess are mandatory for a normal course of the latter, for the benefit of
employees first of all. Ambiguities in this respect bred tension and fear
both of which are destabilizing and their sole result was a drop in
production.
In its turn, the law on the settlement of collective labour conflicts can
halt sudden, anarchic and abnormal walkouts. Thus, the right to strike
must truly be the last efficient lever to be resorted to only after all the
other ways of settling conflicts have been exhausted.
1 34
Parliament passed the legislation on collective labor disputes in late
1990,135 but the wake of the agreement ending the Drivers' Union strike
in mid-December resulted in delaying presidential approval. Mean-
while, the government-trade union commission held discussions on pro-
posed legislation in the labor field.' l 6 As a consequence of these
discussions, President Iliescu refused to sign the bill and resubmitted it
instead in late January 1991 for consideration of the trade unions' pro-
posed amendments.' 3 7 The government refused to support the recom-
mendations of the joint government-trade union commission regarding
these amendments, however, apparently in violation of its agreement to
do so, 138 and parliament rejected them. 139 The Senate thus reapproved
Law 15/1991 on February 7, 1991; the Chamber of Deputies approved
and President Iliescu signed it on February 11.140
B. Law 15/1991-The Concept of the "Collective Labor Dispute"
and Mandatory Conciliation
1. The "Collective Labor Dispute"
At the heart of Law 15/1991 is the definition of collective labor disputes.
Article 2(1) provides:
134. Id. at 116.
135. The Chamber of Deputies approved it first, in early November. United States
Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ADEVXRUL, Nov. 7, 1990, at 3 (Nov. 7,
1990) (on file with author).
136. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, DIMINEATX, Dec.
21, 1990, at 1, 2 (Dec. 21, 1990) (on file with author).
137. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ADEVXRUL, Jan. 29,
1991, at 5 (Jan. 29, 1991) (on file with author).
138. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, REALITATEA, Jan.
29, 1991, at 1, 2 (Jan. 29, 1991) (on file with author). Victor Ciorbea, president of
CNSLR, a participant at the debates on reconsideration in early February 1991,
claims that the government's representative before the Senate was pleading for an
entirely different version of the collective labor disputes law than that agreed upon in
the joint commission. Ciorbea's efforts to persuade the legislators to approve the
amendments were unsuccessful. Interview with Victor Ciorbea, supra note 129.
139. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ADEVARUL, Feb. 2,
1991, at 5 (Feb. 4, 1991) (on file with author).
140. MONITORUL OFICIAL AL ROMANIEI, Partea I, Feb. 11, 1991, at 4 (the official
text of the statute, "Lege pentru solulionarea conflictelor colective de muncg" was
published in this edition of the Monitorul Oficial).
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Conflicts regarding the economic and social professional interests of
employees, whether or not they are organized in trade-unions, resulting
from labor relations between the company, on the one hand, and its
employees or the majority of its employees, on the other hand, represent
collective labor disputes and are to be settled according to the provisions
of the present law. 14 1
Significantly, only primary disputes, or those between an enterprise
and its own workers, are recognized as collective labor disputes. Worker
grievances stemming from dissatisfaction with the acts of others, includ-
ing government policy and the conduct of other employers, as opposed
to the acts or policy of their own employer, presumably are not recog-
nized as legitimate collective labor disputes under the statute. In short,
sympathy strikes and secondary boycotts are not within the law's scope.
As a result, the employer is under no duty to respond to employee
demands in such cases or to participate in the statutory conciliation pro-
cedures. Moreover, the employees could never lawfully strike over such
demands. Article 5 directs that "employees may go on strike only under
the conditions stipulated in the present law' 14 2 and Article 22 includes
as a condition that "all possibilities of settling the collective labor dis-
pute were previously exhausted through the [statutory conciliation] pro-
cedures ...... 143
Given the definition of collective labor dispute, industry-wide or
nation-wide disputes would have to be processed as individual company-
based matters through the first two stages of the statute's conciliation
machinery before a trade union could be assured of the legality of any
wider work stoppage. For example, strikes such as that of the Drivers'
Union in December 1990 could not progress lawfully without first
processing a collective labor dispute through the stage of mandatory
conciliation before the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection's repre-
sentative in each and every enterprise in which Drivers' Union members
would stop work. As a practical matter, labor disputes at the level of
trade union federations (industry-wide disputes) or confederations
(multi-industry disputes) would be so cumbersome to process correctly
that procedural inadequacies and timing difficulties would probably
make successful national coordination of the requisite statutory compli-
ance very problematic. 144
Furthermore, the statute addresses disputes arising from "labor
relations." Arguably, therefore, worker unhappiness with company
141. Law 15/1991, art. 2(1). Article 2(2) adds to the basic definition disputes
within enterprise subunits- and those involving specific professions or trades within
an enterprise. One commentator described the subsection as adding little of signifi-
cance to the concept of the collective labor dispute. ;ERBAN BELIGRXDEANu, LEGISLA-
TIA MUNCH 1990-1991, Vol. I, at 151 (Editura Lumina Bucure§ti 1991).
142. Law 15/1991, art. 5.
143. Id. art. 22.
144. This prediction was the view of one of Romania's most influential labor lead-
ers. Interview with Victor Ciorbea, supra note 129.
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actions in other areas, such as marketing, advertising or product design,
would not qualify as a collective labor dispute.
In addition to limiting collective labor disputes to those arising
from the company's labor relations policy or practice, the statute
expressly excludes from treatment as collective labor disputes two kinds
of disputes that might otherwise qualify. The first entails those conflicts
between workers and their enterprise which are subject to legal regula-
tions other than Law 15/1991.145 The second kind includes employee
claims which would require the adoption of a new law in order to settle
them. 146 For example, again using the Drivers' December 1990 strike, if
the workers sought a change in licensing requirements for professional
truck drivers, their demands could not form the basis for a collective
labor dispute, the predicate for a strike, because the relief they sought
could only be provided by amending existing law. Thus, as with dis-
putes not centered in the employer's labor relations practices or poli-
cies, the employer would be under no duty to follow the conciliation
procedure to resolve the employees' grievances on such subjects, and
the employees could not lawfully strike to secure their demands.
Despite the limitations inherent in the concept of "collective labor
dispute," in other respects, the statute's coverage is remarkably broad.
Its definition of "enterprise" or "company," covers virtually every
employer in Romania, public as well as private. 14 7 Thus, as long as the
subject involves the employees' "economic and social professional inter-
ests" and the conflict results from the employer's labor relations policy,
and its settlement is neither governed by other existing laws nor would
require passing a new law, Romanian employees and employers must
attempt to settle the dispute by following Law 15/1991's conciliation
procedures.148
2. The Mandatory Conciliation Procedure
The burden is upon the trade union1 49 to initiate the conciliation pro-
145. Law 15/1991, art. 3(a).
146. Id. art. 3(b).
147. According to Article 6, "[flor the purposes of the present law, 'company' shall
mean: autonomous state organizations, state or privately owned companies, other
profit-making organizations, public institutions, associations [or] any type [of] state
bodies." Id. art. 6. The terms "enterprise" and "company" are used interchangeably
in this article.
148. In fact, although the statute is far from clear on this point, it would appear
that collective labor disputes in certain enterprises (power companies, the "operative
departments of nuclear reactors," "companies with continuous functioning the cessa-
tion of which brings the danger of explosion," defense industries and civil personnel
in the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs) must be
resolved at the second stage of conciliation, with the assistance of the conciliator
assigned by the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection. Id. art. 45(l)(b), (2). See
BELIGIU DEANU, supra note 141, at 173 (the language that the parties "shall settle" the
demands is "imperative"). In any event, the statute clearly forbids strikes in such
enterprises. Law 15/1991, art. 45(1). See infra text accompanying notes 165-66.
149. The statute provides that, in addition to trade union representatives, "[uln
case that in the company a trade union has not been set up or not all the employees
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cess. Under the statute, a collective labor dispute does not exist until
the trade union has first presented the employees' demands to the com-
pany, along with a statement of "their motivation" and proposals for
settlement, 150 and the company has either rejected some or all of the
demands or has not responded in writing within forty-eight hours.'15
Once the company has either refused to agree with the trade
union's demands or failed to answer within forty-eight hours, a collec-
tive labor dispute is considered to have begun and the trade union must
notify the local office of the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection to
request conciliation. 152 Within twenty-four hours of registering the.
notification, the Ministry must appoint a representative to conduct con-
ciliation.153 The conciliator, in turn, must notify the appropriate com-
pany manager within forty-eight hours of his or her appointment1 54 and
must convene the parties for conciliation no later than seven days from
the registration of the trade union's notification with the Ministry. 155
Articles 13 and 14 of the statute regulate who can represent the
company and the trade union in the conciliation proceeding. Appar-
ently, the company's manager may either be the sole representative, or
may appoint a delegation of two to five members from its Board of
Administration. 156 The workers must elect trade union representatives,
on the other hand, each time a new dispute arises. 157 The only persons
who can qualify to run in such an election are those who have been com-
pany employees for at least three years (or from the company's found-
ing, if less than three years old), who are twenty-one years old, and who
have not been convicted of violations of the criminal provisions of Law
15/1991 (Articles 46 and 47) or of Article 64 of Romania's Penal
Code.' 58 These provisions prevent the trade union leadership from
freely designating representatives of their own choosing, both because
the employees themselves must choose representatives, in an election
specific to each individual enterprise dispute, and because many persons
are trade union members, the employees will elect their representatives in order to
settle the collective labor dispute." Law 15/199 1, art. 4(2). In order not to unduly
complicate the narrative, situations requiring such ad hoc employee representatives
will not be discussed herein.
150. Id. art. 7. The demands must be in writing, unless the company management
receives the required submission orally and records it and any discussions "in a
report." Id. art. 7(2), (3).
151. Id. arts. 8, 9.
152. Id. art. 10. Two written copies of the notification must be submitted, signed
by the authorized trade union representative and containing the name of the com-
pany and its manager, the object of the dispute and its motivation, proof that the
demands have been properly presented to the company and not resolved at that
level, and the names of the persons authorized to represent the trade union. Id. art.
11.
153. Id. art. 12.
154. Id. art. 12(a).
155. Id. art. 12(b).
156. Id. art. 14.
157. Id. art. 13(1).
158. Id. art. 13(3).
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who might otherwise be chosen in such elections would be ineligible
under the statutory restrictions. These restrictions are only partially off-
set by another section which allows representatives of the federation or
the confederation with which the trade union is affiliated to be members
of the trade union delegation.1 59
The conciliation proceeding must be completed on the day the par-
ties are convened, unless the parties agree that it may continue
longer. 160 The "statements of the parties and the result of the debates"
are to be recorded in a report, which the parties and the conciliator each
sign and retain a copy. 16 1 This record must specify which of the
demands were settled and which were not, as well as "the points of view
of each party regarding the latter."' 62
If the parties reach an agreement during the conciliation proceed-
ing, it is binding on all parties to the collective labor dispute "for the
entire period agreed upon."' 6 3 Whether or not they reach full agree-
ment, the trade union representatives must communicate the results of
the conciliation to the employees.'
It is unclear whether this requirement of mandatory conciliation will
be an effective device to resolve collective labor disputes. Given the lack
of emphasis on the actual mediating role of the official conciliator, how-
ever, as well as the freedom of either disputing party to refuse to con-
tinue conciliation beyond the first day, mandatory conciliation often will
be reduced to a pro forma exercise, with the parties simply stating their
cases in front of the government's representative before moving on to
the strike phase of the dispute.
C. Strikes
1. Workers Precluded from Striking
Although nearly all public and private employees can, and indeed must,
process collective work disputes through the conciliation process before
the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, a vast number of workers in
the government and in crucial state-run enterprises have been deprived
of the right to strike. First, all professional and technical employees
(those with "specialized functions") of Parliament, the Government, the
ministries and other central administrative agencies, prefects (represent-
atives of the central government in each county), as well as all public
prosecutors, judges, employees of the Ministries of National Defense
and Internal Affairs and their subordinate units, and military personnel
of the Ministry of Justice are prohibited from declaring strikes. 165 Sec-
ond, the employees of companies that are part of the national power
159. Id. art. 13(1).
160. Id. art. 15(2).
161. Id. art. 16(2), (3).
162. Id. art. 18.
163. Id. art. 17.
164. Id. art. 19.
165. Id. art. 45(1)(a).
Vol. 26
1993 Collective Labor Disputes in Romania
system, of the operating departments of nuclear reactors, of "companies
with continuous functioning the cessation of which brings the danger of
explosion" and of companies in the defense industry are likewise denied
the right to strike. 166 Finally, transportation employees may not strike
outside the boundaries of Romania.16 7
In addition to the total prohibition of strikes by these employees,
the statute also limits another large group of workers, some of whom
may eventually work for private as well as public employers, to strikes
which can only partially shut down their enterprise's normal activity.
This unusual restriction requires the continuation of at least one-third
of the essential services with strikes in the fields of health care,
pharmaceuticals, education, telecommunication, radio and television,
railways, airlines, as well as state enterprises supplying public transpor-
tation, public sanitation, bread, milk, meat, gas, electric power, heat and
water supplies.' 6 8
2. Unlawful Objectives
In addition to the foregoing restrictions on strikes by specified catego-
ries of workers, all employees are precluded from striking in support of
certain kinds of demands. First, no demand that cannot give rise to a
"collective labor dispute" can result in a lawful strike. As discussed
above, 169 all of the following are thus unlawful: sympathy strikes; strikes
to change the policy of an entity, including the government, other than
the direct employer; strikes to change an employer's policy in fields
other than labor relations; and strikes for demands concerning subjects
whose regulation is either governed by existing law or would require the
passage of a new law.
In addition, Article 24(2) of the statute prohibits strikes "aim[ed] at
political purposes."' 170 At a minimum, strikes with the express goal of
bringing down the government are unlawful. Thus, the NSF govern-
ment erected a legal barrier against the most direct challenge the trade
unions posed to its continued existence. Repetition of general strikes
166. Id. art. 45(l)(b).
167. Id. art. 45(3). Sailors on merchant marine ships sailing under the Romanian
flag may strike only in accordance with the norms established by international agree-
ments ratified by Romania. Id.
168. Id. art. 45(4). Exactly what will constitute compliance with the "maintenance
of 1/3 essential services" requirement is certain to cause major judicial headaches.
In probably its first legal test, a suit under Article 33 involving railway unions in
Bucharest, the railway management argued that the statute required the unions to
assure that one-third of the operations on which the strikers normally worked had to
be kept running. The strikers took the position that, since their operations were only
a small part of the overall national railroad system, the statute was satisfied because
far more than one-third of the essential services were functioning even though their
operations were entirely shut down. Interview with Magistrate Daniela Lupa§, Sector
OneJudicatorie, in Bucharest, Romania (Mar. 18, 1992).
169. See discussion supra part IV.B.l.
170. Law 15/1991, art. 24(2).
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such as the ones in December 1990 by the Drivers' Union' 7 1 and by the
Timi§oara unions 172 could henceforth result in legal action that would
not only put an immediate end to the work stoppages, but could also
lead to personal liability of those responsible for them. 173
The implications of the "no political objectives" provision are much
broader, however, given the fact that for the foreseeable future, the
Romanian state will continue to own or run vast sectors of the Romanian
economy. Many trade union objectives that other nations would con-
sider to be purely economic will thus be labelled "political" in Romania
because their satisfaction would require government action. The poten-
tial reach of this proscription is thus great, especially as it works in tan-
dem with the prohibitions described in the first paragraph of this
subsection.
The kinds of strikes that so bedeviled the NSF government from its
beginning are also forbidden, namely, those aimed at forcing changes in
company management. Article 24(3) bars strikes to annul a company's
cancellation of an employment contract, its employment of a person, or
its change of a person's job. 174 Thus, strikes in support of one of
labor's most common demands during the period of transition from
communism, replacement of ineffective or obstreperous company offi-
cials, were outlawed. This restriction appears calculated to reinforce
Prime Minister Roman's objective of strengthening the power of enter-
prise management vis-a-vis labor.175
Finally, Article 25 prohibits strikes seeking to change any of the fol-
lowing during the time they are in force: collective bargaining agree-
ments; other agreements, including those reached in previous
conciliation proceedings under this statute; and decisions of an arbitra-
171. See supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
173. See discussion infra part IV.C.4.
174. Law 15/1991, art. 24(3). Even though this restriction accomplishes the gov-
ernment's goal of ending strikes to force personnel changes, it also reflects existing
Romanian law:
On the other hand, the provision of art. 24 para. 3 is natural, it being an
established norm in force from the principle of art. 19 letter c of the Labor
Code (guaranteeing stability in work) or of those which regulate the jurisdic-
tion in the domain of the individual labor dispute. Or, again, it cannot be
conceived that the parties "conciliate" concerning the modification or the
dissolution of the labor contract of any person or changing the solutions pro-
nounced by the competent jurisdictional organ of labor.
Through the provisions of art. 3 letter b [employee claims requiring the
adoption of a new law] and art. 24 para. 2 [political objectives] and 3 [person-
nel changes], Law nr. 15/1991 has a tendency to pierce the former social
practice in Romania (in the period from January 1990 until the entry in force
of the law), in keeping with which-the nonexistence of a legal regulation
which established the conditions of exercise of the right of strike-the striker
demands were, very frequently, exactly of the nature of those refered to in
the mentioned text.
erban Beligrideanu, Legea Nr. 15/1991 Pentru Solu(ionarea Conflictelor Colective de
Muncd, DREPrUL, Nr. 2-3/1990 [sic], at 4.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
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tion commission, under Article 43 of this statute, which ended earlier
strikes. 176 As a result, trade unions may not attempt to force renegoti-
ation of voluntary agreements, presumably even those made by other
unions, t7 7 and they may not strike to change imposed terms of settle-
ments reached in compulsory arbitration. 178
3. Conditions for Initiating and Maintaining a Strike
Assuming that a given body of workers is permitted to strike and that
their collective labor dispute concerns an object for which it is permissi-
ble to strike, they must observe the conditions precedent to lawfully ini-
tiating and maintaining a work stoppage. As a preliminary matter,
workers may not declare a strike until "all the possibilities of settling the
collective labor dispute were previously exhausted through the settle-
ment procedures provided in [the internal and Ministry of Labor and
Social Protection conciliation provisions of Articles 7-19 of Law 15/
1991] ... .,,179 Moreover, the workers must notify the company man-
agement forty-eight hours before the commencement of the strike.' 8 0
Another important precondition to a lawful strike weakens the
power of trade union leaders in the name of democratic decision-making
and the employees' right to work. In a sense, the entire statute rests on
the basic principle, contained in its first article, that "[t]he exercise of
the right to work... [is] guaranteed by Romanian law and may not be
restricted."'18 Protection of this right results in the statute's description
of the strike as "a collective and voluntary cessation of labor."' 8 2 The
statute thus combines concepts of voluntarism and collectivity to reach a
principle of majority rule. The workers themselves must approve a work
stoppage; a majority must agree to declare a strike before one can
legally begin.' 8 3 If, once commenced, half of employees abandon the
176. Law 15/1991, art. 25.
177. In fact, this issue was raised by one of the railway trade unions, which was the
defendant in a damages suit brought under Article 33. The trade union claimed that
the collective bargaining agreement terms it sought to change by a strike were ones
negotiated by a previous union; it claimed that it had not signed the agreement,
therefore it should not be estopped from striking in order to reach a new agreement.
Interview with Magistrate Daniela Lupa§, Sector One Judicatorie, in Bucharest,
Romania (Mar. 18, 1992). The court ruled against the trade union on this issue,
holding that while the agreement was in effect, no strike to change its terms was
lawful, even a strike by a union which was not a party to it. Telephone Interview with
Magistrate Daniela Lupa§ (Oct. 25, 1992).
178. See discussion infra part IV.C.6.
179. Law 15/1991, art. 22.
180. Id.
181. Id. art. 1. This right currently finds its ultimate source in Article 38(1) of the
Romanian Constitution of 1991, which provides: "The right to work cannot be
restricted. Professions and jobs may be freely chosen." Flanz, supra note 1, at 12.
182. Law 15/1991, art. 20(1) (emphasis added).
183. Id. The strike vote must be by secret ballot if the employees are not repre-
sented by a trade union, but apparently this is not required if they are unionized. Id.
This requirement of majority support to sustain a strike is particularly onerous in a
labor relations environment in which more than one trade union may represent a
given unit of workers. It is not uncommon for a single factory to have several differ-
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strike, "it must cease."' 18 4
Other articles protecting the rights of non-strikers also reflect the
primacy of the right to work. Under Article 26, participation in a strike
is voluntary, no one can be forced to participate, or refuse to participate
in a strike, non-strikers may continue their work, and strikers "must
refrain from any action meant to hinder the continuation of activity by
those who do not participate in the strike."1 8 5 Persons found to have
forced workers "by threats or violence" to participate in a strike, or to
work during one, are subject to fines and imprisonment up to six
months. 186
During the course of an on-going strike, its organizers have a
number of continuing duties toward the company, in addition to
refraining from interfering with the activities of non-strikers. They must
"protect the company's assets and.., ensure the continuous function-
ing of equipment and facilities which, by ceasing to function, would
endanger people's lives and health or may cause irreparable dam-
ages."'18 7 Neither the organizers nor the striking employees may hinder
the company management in carrying out its duties.' 8 8 Lastly, the
organizers have a duty to continue negotiations with management to
resolve the claims underlying the collective labor dispute.18 9
4. The Employer's Recourse Against "Illegal Strikes"
Violation of any of the foregoing limitations on what constitutes a lawful
strike, or of any of the requirements for its lawful conduct, results in an
illegal strike. An enterprise manager faced with an illegal strike may
bring suit in the district court (judic~torie) where the enterprise head-
quarters is located.' 90 The court must set a hearing within three days,' 9 1
at which time it must either reject the application of the enterprise or
approve it and order the strike's cessation. 19 2 An aggrieved party must
file an appeal from the district court's judgment with the county court
ent unions representing workers in the same job classifications. When one trade
union feels the need to strike, but the others do not agree, the statute would appear
to hamstring the former.
184. Law 15/1991, art. 23. According to a leading authority on the statute, the
correct interpretation of this provision is that one-half of the strikers, not of the total
number of employees, must renounce the strike. BELIGRXDEANU, supra note 141, at
165.
185. Law 15/1991, art. 26. A successful strike which completely shuts down a
company's operations is not deemed a prohibited hindrance of non-strikers' activi-
ties, however. Id. art. 26(4).
186. Id. art. 46(1).
187. Id. art. 27.
188. Id. art. 28.
189. Id. art. 32(1). In the event agreement is reached, the strike is to cease. Id. art.
32(2). Refusal to negotiate makes the strike organizers liable to the company for
"the damages caused to [its] assets" during the strike. Id. art. 32(3).
190. Id. art. 33.
191. Id. art. 34.
192. Id. art. 35(1).
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(tribunal) or the Bucharest municipal court. 193 After the courts declare
the strike illegal and order its cessation, they also are expected to
"decide upon compelling the guilty persons to indemnify the company
claims for the damage caused to it."' 19 4
Law 15/1991 provides generally that strikers and strike organizers
cannot suffer negative consequences as a result of strikes which observe
the provisions of the statute. 195 In the event a court declares a strike
illegal, however, the employer may lawfully discharge strikers who per-
sist in their work stoppage after that decision, in addition to seeking
damages.' 9
6
5. Employer-Initiated Judicial Suspension of Strikes Affecting Major National
Economic or Humanitarian Interests
Articles 30 and 31 offer employers the prospect of temporarily forestall-
ing some strikes that otherwise are lawful in all respects. Under their
provisions, company managers faced with a collective labor dispute may
petition the Romanian Supreme Court to suspend commencement of an
impending strike, or its continuation, if already begun, for up to ninety
days;' 9 7 the court may act if "major interests of the national economy or
humanitarian interests are affected by it."1 9 8 The court must make a
decision within seven days of the filing of the company's petition,19 9 and
its judgments are final.200 Thus, national or regional transportation
strikes, like that of the Drivers' Union in December 1990, as well as that
of the rail workers in February 1991, are probably always vulnerable to
suspension in the national interest. In fact, the government immediately
invoked these provisions against the railway strikers upon Law 15/
1991's passage, an event discussed below. 20 1
193. Id. art. 35(2).
194. Id. art. 36(3). The statute is ambiguous on the point of whether the court of
first instance (the district court) or only the appellate court (the county court) may
award damages. One Romanian commentator suggests that the district court has
such power. BELIGRXDEANU, supra note 141, at 169. Beligr~deanu also insists that
only the strike organizers, as distinct from the other workers, are liable for the pay-
ment of damages under the terms of Article 36(3). Id. at 168. Individual worker
liability could lie, however, under provisions of the Labor Code or other principles of
civil liability if, for instance, they destroyed enterprise property. Id. at 170. Law 15/
1991 itself envisions this prospect. Article 48 states that "[t]he employees' participa-
tion in a strike does not eliminate their material, contraventional, civil or penal
responsibility, as the case may be, if the actions carried out during the strike entail
this responsibility, according to law." Law 15/1991, art. 48.
195. Law 15/1991, art. 29(1). Strikers also keep all rights under collective bar-
gaining agreements except the right to wages and other payments. Id. art. 29(3).
196. Id. art. 29(2). The same is true for strikers whose strike has been suspended
under Article 30. Id.
197. Id. art. 30.
198. Id.
199. Id. art. 31(1).
200. Id. art. 31(2).
201. See infra notes 215-18 and accompanying text.
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6. Government-Initiated Mandatory Binding Arbitration
In addition to the two remedies afforded to the affected companies, Law
15/1991 also gives the central government the power to stop certain
strikes and to force the resolution of the underlying collective labor dis-
putes in a binding arbitration proceeding. Under the statute, the Minis-
try of Labor and Social Protection enjoys tremendous discretion in this
regard, which does not appear to be subject to judicial review.
Under Article 38(1), if a strike continued for twenty days without an
agreement between the disputing parties and if the Ministry of Labor
and Social Protection determines that its continuation "may affect the
interests of the national economy or humanitarian interests," the Minis-
try may "request that the collective labor dispute be settled by an arbi-
tration committee."'20 2 The trade union must suspend the strike on the
day the Ministry communicates its initiative in writing to the parties. 20 3
The parties then select a committee of three arbitrators, 20 4 the
company, trade union and Ministry of Labor 20 5 each selecting one arbi-
trator. The parties select from a list of prospective arbitrators the Minis-
try of Labor and Social Protection will compile once a year, after
consultation with the trade unions and the Romanian Chamber of Com-
merce and Industry. 20 6
Once the parties appoint an arbitration committee, they must sub-
mit to it all written documentation concerning the collective labor dis-
pute as well as statements of their positions.20 7 Then, within three days
of receiving this material, the committee is required to convene the par-
ties and "together with them examine the collective labor dispute, on
the basis of the provisions of [Law 15/1991 ] and of the applicable provi-
sions of collective bargaining agreements. '20 8 The committee is
expected to reach a "final resolution" within twenty-four hours of the
end of these proceedings. 20 9 On the basis of this resolution, "the col-
lective labor dispute shall cease."'2 10
The various aspects of this binding arbitration procedure reflect a
desire to empower the government to end major strikes and the under-
lying disputes permanently. First, it is within the sole prerogative of a
202. Law 15/1991, art. 38(1) (emphasis added).
203. Id. art. 38(2). Although the statutory language speaks of a "suspension," ("se
suspendg continuarea grevei") in reality the strike is ended permanently, because a
binding arbitration decision will resolve the dispute, which, under Article 25, cannot
be the basis for any further lawful strike activity. Id. art. 25.
204. Id. art. 39(1).
205. Id. art. 40.
206. Id. art. 39(2). No readily identifiable pool of such persons exists in Romania
because there is no history of using neutral arbitrators. During a number of discus-
sions the author had with Romanian trade unionists in late 1991 and early 1992, the
subject of the difficulty of selecting qualified persons to recommend for inclusion on
this list arose repeatedly.
207. Id. art. 42.
208. Id. art. 43(1).
209. Id. art. 43(2).
210. Id. art. 43(4).
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government ministry to initiate arbitration. Neither the parties nor the
courts can force a binding arbitral resolution to an otherwise lawful
strike, the ninety-day suspension under Article 30 constituting the only
other basis for temporarily interrupting the workings of economic weap-
ons in such cases. The only limitations on the government's invocation
of arbitration, that the strike has progressed for at least twenty days and
that it "may" affect the national economy or humanitarian interests,
merely delay the use of the government's power, for apparently there is
no check on its determination that the necessary harmful effects might
occur.
Second, the government has an advantage whenever its interests
and those of the company are parallel, given that together they appoint
a majority of the arbitration committee. This advantage remains as long
as so many companies remain under government ownership. 2 11
Finally, once the labor dispute has ended on the basis of the arbitra-
tion committee's decision, the law forecloses any future strikes over the
issues concluded therein. As noted previously,2 1 2 "[s]trikes may not be
declared for obtaining changes in ... an arbitration commission's final
resolution [under Article 43] by which a collective labor dispute has
been settled .... ,,213
D. The Impact of Law 15/1991 on Labor Disputes in Romania
The legal regime for regulating collective labor disputes and strikes thus
consists of several different aspects. Workers in fields considered crucial
to national security and well-being, regardless of whether their compa-
nies will eventually be privatized, either cannot strike at all or their abil-
ity to do so is so restricted that a successful strike is unlikely, in light of
the requirement that at least one-third of the essential services must be
continued. In addition to the prohibition of striking to change govern-
ment policy or existing law, no one may strike over acts or policies of
anyone other than their employer. One may not strike to force changes
in management or in enterprise policies or practices outside the labor
relations area. No strike may begin until at least forty-eight hours after
the completion of the mandatory conciliation procedures. Realistically,
this provision entails that it will take approximately eleven days from the
trade union's presentation of its demands before a lawful strike can
begin. Strikes supported by only a minority of workers are illegal and
strikers must avoid hindering either strike-breakers or management in
211. Romanian trade union leaders certainly hold this view. In discussing the rela-
tionship of the management of state-owned companies and of employers' groups like
the Romanian Chamber of Commerce and Industry to the government itself, the
union representatives stressed that they saw them as essentially one and the same.
Interview with Victor Ciorbea, supra note 54 ("These so-called owners are state
employees . . . ") Interview with Miron Cosma, supra note 43 (The miners have no
interest in tripartite collective bargaining, as it "is a case of 'two on one,' with the
government and employers being the same party.").
212. See supra text accompanying notes 176-78.
213. Law 15/1991, art. 25.
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any way. Furthermore, the strike organizers have an affirmative duty to
cooperate with management, and in many cases, to assure continued
operations during the strike. Courts may enjoin strikes which are in any
respect illegal and may assess damages against the organizers, and in
some cases, individual workers. Workers who continue to strike in the
face of a court order risk loss of their jobs. The Supreme Court may
suspend for ninety days strikes which will affect the national economy or
humanitarian interests. After twenty days, the Ministry of Labor and
Social Protection may halt those strikes which "may" affect those inter-
ests, in addition to imposing a binding resolution of the underlying dis-
pute by a committee whose majority is appointed by the government
and the company.
The cumulative effect of these restrictions has been to neutralize
the strike as a significant weapon in the Romanian labor movement's
arsenal. This neutralization did not occur immediately upon passage in
February 1991. By the end of that year, however, the strike had virtually
disappeared as a meaningful part of trade union tactics.
The role of Law 15/1991 was not always readily apparent in the
labor strife which occurred after its passage. Reported instances of the
courts or the government actually invoking the law have been relatively
infrequent. In fact, the first effort to apply it ended with the strikers in
question, the railway workers in the Ia§i and Timi§oara rail strike of Feb-
ruary 1991, essentially flouting the law. On February 15, the Supreme
Court, acting under Article 30, issued a ruling to suspend the strike for
sixty days, based upon the government's assertions that it imperiled the
national economy and humanitarian interests. 2 14 The strikers ignored
the ruling, however, arguing that the law was invalidly applied to them
for three reasons: a government ministry and not the railway employer
sought the ruling, the strike began before the law's effective date and the
law itself was invalid. 2 15 The strike continued for six more days after the
Supreme Court's ruling, ending only when ministry-level negotiators,
with the help of President Iliescu, succeeded in satisfying the strikers'
214. Transport Ministry Issues Communique on Railway Strikes, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts (Rompres in English, Feb. 13, 1991) Feb. 15, 1991, available in LEXIS,
Europe Library, Alleur File; United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Sum-
mary, ROMANIA LiBERX, Feb. 15, 1991, at 1 (Feb. 15, 1991) (on file with author);
United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMANIA LIBERX, Feb. 16,
1991, at 1 (Feb. 19, 199 1) (on file with author); Romanian Supreme Court to Hear Railway
Strike Case, Xinhua General News Service, Feb. 15, 1991, available in LEXIS, Europe
Library, Alleur File.
215. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMANIA LIBERX,
Feb. 16, 1991, at 2 (Feb. 19, 1991) (on file with author). While most government
representatives and railway department officials immediately took the position that
Law 15/1991 controlled the dispute from the date of its promulgation, United States
Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, TINERETIJL LIBER, Feb. 14, 1991, at 2
(Feb. 14, 1991) (on file with author), the unions and at least one deputy state minister
at the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection believed that the law did not apply to
disputes and strikes which had begun before that date. United States Embassy
(Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMANIA LIBERX, Feb. 14, 1991, at 2 (Feb. 14,
1991) (on file with author).
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demands. 21 6
Rather than sparking widespread trade union action in defiance of
Law 15/1991, this disregard of the Supreme Court's decision instead
marked the beginning of the end of the era of major strikes. There was
a final flowering of work stoppages in May and June 1991, the chief one
occurring at the Faur factory in Bucharest. 21 7 Although that strike was
eventually settled through the personal intervention of Prime Minister
Roman,218 government officials threatened the strikers with Law 15/
1991, warning that their objectives were illegal because they were polit-
ical and threatening the organizers with liability for damages. 2 19
Another dispute during this period, a one-day work stoppage by rail
workers, actually led to the filing of a damages suit, discharges, and
criminal charges against union leaders. 2 20
216. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMANIA LIBERX,
Feb. 22, 1991, at 1 (Feb. 22, 1991) (on file with author). The striking railway workers
subsequently requested that the Supreme Court reconsider its February 15 ruling.
United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMANIA LiBERX, Feb. 27,
1991, at 1 (Feb. 27, 1991) (on file with author). The Supreme Court ultimately did so
and, on April 12, 1991, it canceled its February 15 order, holding that, since the
strike was discontinued, the case was moot. United States Embassy (Bucharest),
Daily Press Summary, ROMANIA LIBERX, Apr. 13, 1991, at 7 (Apr. 15, 1991) (on file
with author). This decision is curious since it presumably precluded any claims by
the railroads for damages arising from the illegal continuation of the strike beyond
the February 15 order. Perhaps this preclusion was the point of the ruling, however,
to avoid resolving knotty questions of the law's applicability as well as of its apparent
flouting by the railway workers.
217. Faur is one of the biggest factories in Bucharest. The workers at another
large Bucharest facility, the IMGB factory, had struck in mid-May because the com-
pany managers fixed salaries without prior negotiations. United States Embassy
(Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMANIA LIBERX, May 15, 1991, at 3 (May 15,
1991) (on file with author). They returned to work after three days, when a number
of measures were taken to meet their demands. United States Embassy (Bucharest),
Daily Press Summary, DIMINEATA, May 21, 1991, at 1, 2 (May 21, 1991) (on file with
author). Several weeks later, on June 6, their colleagues in the Unitatea trade union
at the Faur plant began a strike, insisting that their demands were economic and
related to the workplace, but also seeking the dismissal of the company's directors.
United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMANIA LiBERX, June 7,
1991, at 2 (June 7, 1991) (on file with author). They were joined by several other
unions at Faur. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ADEVXRUL,
June 8, 1991, at 7 (June 10, 1991) (on file with author); United States Embassy
(Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMANIA LIBERX, June 12, 1991, at 2 (June 12,
1991) (on file with author). IMGB workers and those at a Craiova-based heavy equip-
ment factory walked out in solidarity with the Faur workers on June 12, in apparent
violation of Law 15/1991's exclusion of such strikes. United States Embassy
(Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROMANIA LIBERX, June 13, 1991, at 2; Realitatea,
June 13, 1991, at 1 (June 13, 1991) (on file with author).
218. On June 18, after the Faur workers had staged a huge march in Bucharest,
Prime Minister Roman met with them and negotiated enough of a settlement that
they agreed to return to work. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Sum-
mary, ROMANIA LIBERX, June 19, 1991, at 2 (June 19, 1991) (on file with author).
219. Dan Ionescu, Labor Unrest Escalates, Report on Eastern Europe (Radio Free
Europe, July 12, 1991), at 21-22.
220. United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ADEVXRUL, June
22, 1991, at 2; DREPTATEA, June 22, 1991, at 4 (June 24, 1991) (on file with author);
Railway Union Federation Leader Accused of Disloyalty, BBC Summary of World Broad-
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In the midst of this time of high tension, the Alfa Cartel, having
formed an alliance called the National Confederative Association with
several smaller labor organizations, 2 2' announced a general strike for
the express purpose of forcing the dismissal of the government. 2 22
Although the threatened strike attracted considerable attention, it was a
total failure. Only 3,000 turned out for a June 18, 1991 rally at which
30,000 people were expected 2 23 and the general strike, which was set
for the next day, never materialized. 224
Although a few isolated walk-outs continued to take place in appar-
ent disregard of Law 15/1991,225 for the most part the trade union
movement abandoned confrontation through strikes after the summer
of 1991. It is supremely ironic, therefore, that the government of Prime
Minister Petre Roman was driven from office shortly thereafter, a victim
of the single most violent labor dispute since the NSF's rise to power in
December 1989. The old allies of the NSF, the League of Jiu Valley
Miners, had become unhappy with the government's failure to meet
their economic demands after their defense of the regime in May 1990.
They began a strike in mid-September 1991, which their leader, Miron
Cosma, insists was processed through the initial stages in strict compli-
ance with the requirements of Law 15/1991.226 Deciding to take their
demands to the heart of government, approximately 10,000 miners
casts (Rompres in English, June 20, 1991) June 25, 1991, available in LEXIS, Europe
Library, Alleur File. The Bucharest Municipal Court held that two of the four trade
union federations involved had violated Law 15/1991. Transportation Strikes Declared
Illegal, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Rompres in English, July 26, 1991) July
31, 1991, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File; United States Embassy
(Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ADEVXRUL,July 27, 1991, at 5 (July 29, 1991) (on
file with author).
221. Trade Union Confederations Form National Association, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts (Rompres in English, June 7, 1991) June 11, 1991, available in LEXIS,
Europe Library, Alleur File. According to the communique released by the National
Confederative Association, its goal was to force parliament and President Iliescu to
dismiss the prime minister and his government and institute a new economic and
social program. Id.
222. One-Day Rail Strike; Industrial Unrest Elsewhere, BBC Summary of World Broad-
casts (Rompres in English, June 18, 1991) June 22, 199 1, available in LEXIS, Europe
Library, Alleur File.
223. Lower Turn-out than Expected at Anti-Government Rallies in Bucharest, BBC Sum-
mary of World Broadcasts (Rompres in English, June 18, 1991) June 25, 1991, avail-
able in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File.
224. Peter Humphrey, Romanian Premier Tours Industry to Calm Labour Unrest, The
Reuter Library Report, June 19, 1991, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File.
The strike threat was raised again in early July, Strike Threat Renewed by Romanian
Union, L.A. TiMES, July 3, 1991, at A11, but once more, nothing materialized.
225. A strike in August 1991 at the Zarne§ti armaments factory was also declared
illegal, but the strikers ignored the court's ruling and continued the strike, ultimately
achieving many of their demands, including replacement of enterprise management.
United States Embassy (Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROM.NIA LIBERX, Aug. 15,
1991, at 2; Aug. 22, 1991, at 2 (Aug. 15, 1991; Aug. 22, 1991) (on file with author).
226. Interview with Miron Cosma, supra note 43; see also United States Embassy
(Bucharest), Daily Press Summary, ROM.NIA LIBERX, Sept. 5, 1991, at 2 (Sept. 5,
1991) (on file with author) (Cosma begins negotiations with the government over
salary and allowance issues; strike threatened for September 23).
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descended upon Bucharest in the fourth "mineriada." From September
24-28, 1991, the miners, joined by thousands of Bucharest residents,
attacked government buildings with fire-bombs, held mass rallies, and
generally took the city and the government hostage. 227 Faced with the
most serious threat to national stability since he came to power, Prime
Minister Roman and his cabinet "submitted their mandate" to President
Iliescu, who promptly accepted it as a resignation and appointed a new
coalition government headed by Teodor Stolojan, a widely respected
economist and member of the Roman government. 228
Although many of the leaders of the major trade union organiza-
tions sympathized with the miners' objectives and blamed the govern-
ment for the carnage caused by the "mineriada," they were clearly, and
publicly, repulsed by the violence which accompanied it.229 This stun-
ning outburst of physical force was the final act in the labor movement's
efforts to change the policies of the NSF through strikes or physical con-
frontation, at least at the time of this writing. Since that time, the major
confederations have concentrated their efforts on peaceful negotiations
with the government, and have successfully concluded three major
national-level collective bargaining contracts, resolving such issues as
minimum wages and perhaps even laying the foundation for changes in
the existing Labor Code.230 In addition, labor leaders have participated
regularly in on-going discussions with the government to establish
agreed levels of salary indexation and minimum wages as a way of soft-
227. See, e.g., Miners'Rally in Romania Stirs Riots, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1991, at A3.
The official response to the miners' assault on the government was not processed
within the parameters of Law 15/1991. Rather, the government treated the assault
as an extraordinary affair of state and, as such, it was the subject of a parliamentary
investigation. The report of the parliamentary commission which conducted this
investigation called upon the police, prosecutors and courts to process the events of
the "mineriada" as a criminal prosecution. Parliamentary Commission Blames TU Leader
Cosma for Miners' Events, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Romanian Radio,
Bucharest, Mar. 19, 1992), Mar. 24, 1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur
File. Subsequently, the police investigators submitted a file to the prosecutors pro-
posing criminal prosecution of Miron Cosma and one other activist on the charge of
undermining state power under Article 162 of the Criminal Code. Police Accuse Min-
ers' Leaders of "Undermining" State, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Rompres in
English, May 18, 1992) May 21, 1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File.
228. See Prime Minister of Romania Steps Down, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 27, 1991 at A3;
Romanian Miners Hold Out for President's Resignation, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1991, § 1, at
3; Mary Battiata, Romanian Coal Miners Go Home; Premier Reects Chance to Form New
Cabinet, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 1991, at A25; CarolJ. Williams, Free-Market Economist
Appointed as Romania's New Prime Minister, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1991, at A4.
229. The author attended the September 26, 1991 session of Friia's first national
congress, held in Bucharest on September 23-27, 1991. During the Congress, Fr5-
lia's President, Miron Mitrea, announced the fall of the Roman government and
stated both Frlia's sympathy with the miners' objectives and its rejection of their
violent tactics.
230. Cf. Collective Labour Contract Signed with Three Trade Union Groups, BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts (Rompres in English, Mar. 18, 1992) Mar. 20, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File (first contract negotiated at such a level in
Romania; "[ilt stipulates the first real rights and duties of Romanian employees.").
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ening the effects of price liberalization and inflation. 23 '
It would be misleading to claim that the demise of the strike was
purely a product of the sanctions of Law 15/1991. Many other factors
played important roles in this phenomenon. After the "mineriada" and
the installation of the new government, all sides agreed it was in no
one's interest to destabilize Romanian politics. The government, as well
as the trade unions, made it a policy to engage in dialogue and to keep
tensions down. In fact, when the trade unions pressed issues such as
minimum wages in early 1992, Prime Minister Stolojan threatened to
resign, a bluff that the labor leaders were unwilling to call. 23 2
Nonetheless, the strictures of Law 15/1991 have played a central
role in the disappearance of major strikes from the Romanian political
scene. The government's (technically the enterprise managements')
willingness to use the law and seek damages against trade union
organizers is not an insignificant concern.23 3 As the author observed
during numerous conversations with Romanian trade unionists, they are
all aware of the statute's restrictions. Every labor organization, from
confederation level to local trade unions, has a staff lawyer participating
in its deliberations. Romanian lawyers, in turn, interpret statutes in a
very cautious and conservative fashion, and are quick to label actions
unlawful, instead of searching for legal loopholes which will permit the
trade unions to pursue their objectives in an arguably lawful manner.
Perhaps the best illustration of the trade unions' grudging accept-
ance of the need to comply with Law 15/1991 is the response of the
railway workers to the strike suspension decision the Supreme Court,
handed down against them on May 19, 1992. In stark contrast to the
cavalier disregard of that tribunal's similar order in February 1991, on
this occasion the strike organizers moved quickly to terminate the strike,
declaring, "We have always claimed that we are living in a rule-of-law
state and have to prove that we will respect the principles of such a
state."2
3 4
This reluctance to take on the strike statute seems to be a major
factor in the process which has led the trade unions to pursue other
alternatives. These alternatives include not only the aforementioned
collective bargaining initiatives under Law 13/1991, Collective Labor
Contracts, but also, in recent months, moves to support political parties
that are willing to support labor's agenda legislatively, thus offering the
231. See, e.g., Stolojan Chairs Cabinet Meeting on Salary Issues, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts (Rompres in English, Jan. 18, 1992) Jan. 21, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Europe Library, Alleur File (discusses negotiations with trade unions over minimum
salaries and wage indexation).
232. Interview with Victor Ciorbea, supra note 129.
233. Several damages actions were pending against railroad unions in the district
court for Sector One in Bucharest in early 1992. Interview with Magistrate Daniela
Lupa§, supra note 177.
234. Supreme Court ofJustice Suspends Rail Strike, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts
(Romanian Radio, Bucharest, May 19, 1992) May 27, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Europe Library, Alleur File.
Vol. 26
1993 Collective Labor Disputes in Romania
promise of changing Law 15/1991 itself 28 5
Conclusion
Although a new government took power following the national elections
on September 27, 1992,236 the legal status of collective labor disputes
will probably remain essentially unchanged in the immediate future. It
is unlikely that the new leaders will dramatically alter the general param-
eters of the economic program begun under Prime Minister Roman and
pursued with perhaps even more determination by his successor, Prime
Minister Stolojan. The most noticeable change is that the pace of transi-
tion has slowed somewhat. A relatively gradual transfer of ownership
from the government to private hands should continue in the old state
industries, extending over a period of five to ten years. There would
then be every incentive to maintain the legal regulations which prevent
broad political challenges to the government's stewardship of the non-
privatized industries.
Even though new private sector businesses are playing an increas-
ingly important role in the economic life of the country, it is unlikely that
they will initiate modification of Law 15/1991 either. It is of course con-
ceivable that private employers will chafe under the mandatory arbitra-
tion powers given to the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, when
disputes arise in which the interests of the government and of the pri-
vate enterprise are not congruent. On the whole, however, a statute
largely intended to shield the government as employer from destabi-
lizing labor unrest should work well in private hands. There is certainly
235. Frlia, the Alfa Cartel and CNSLR participated in the creation of the Conven-
tion of Social Solidarity, a political party with a social democratic platform. See Party
Founded to Protect Rights of Employees, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Rompres in
English, Apr. 23, 1992) Apr. 27, 1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File;
Convention of Social Solidarity Gathers in Bucharest with Trade Union Backing, BBC Sum-
mary of World Broadcasts (Rompres in English, Aug. 23, 1992) Aug. 28, 1992, avail-
able in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur File. The National Trade Union Bloc (BNS),
the fourth important national confederation, signed a pre-election pact with the main
opposition coalition, the Democratic Convention. National Trade Union Bloc and Demo-
cratic Convention Sign Agreements, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Rompres in
English, Sept. 23, 1992) Sept. 26, 1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur
File.
236. President Iliescu easily won re-election, with approximately sixty percent of
the popular vote. Ex-Communist Leader Re-elected in Romania, N.Y.TiMEs, Oct. 13, 1992,
at A13. His party, the National Salvation Front, had split into two major parties at its
March 1992 convention. Petre Roman retained control of the NSF, keeping its social
democratic reformist tendencies. Party Backs Romanian Premier, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 29,
1992, § 1, at 6. A new party was formed, the Democratic National Salvation Front
(DNSF), composed chiefly of more conservative supporters of President Iliescu and
his go-slow approach to economic reform. 22nd December Pro-liescu NSF Splinter Group
Registered as "Democratic NSF, "BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Romanian Radio,
Bucharest, Apr. 30, 1992) May 2, 1992, available in LEXIS, Europe Library, Alleur
File; Democratic NSF Denies It Is Ant[-]Roman or Pro[-]lliescu, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts (Rompres in English, May 7, 8, 1992) May 13, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Europe Library, Alleur File. The new government was drawn primarily from the
ranks of DNSF supporters.
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no reason to believe that private business would be interested in loosen-
ing its strictures. The difficulty of beginning and conducting a lawful
strike under Law 15/1991, as it currently stands, is as well suited to pri-
vate as to government interests.
The National Salvation Front achieved its short-term goal of ending
labor's use of strikes to challenge the government's management and
policies. In the long-term, Law 15/1991 will continue to discourage
labor activism, even as Romania's owners change slowly from public
entities to private entrepreneurs.
